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ABSTRACT
Much research has explored socio-scientific issues (SSIs) in science instruction, including the
connections between conceptions and attitude. Studies have also shown that epistemic beliefs
affect epistemic emotions, which are a key component of students’ reaction to complex scientific
topics. Correcting misconceptions can also result in emotional and attitude change, particularly
surrounding the topic of genetically modified foods (GMFs). However, the impact of epistemic
beliefs on emotions and attitude towards GMFs has largely gone unexplored. The purpose of this
study is to examine the effects of epistemic beliefs on epistemic emotions and attitudes towards
GMFs. This quantitative correlational study sampled 78 students from a large Christian
university in Virginia. Participants were assessed for epistemic belief, then read refutation and
persuasive texts about GMFs prior to completing questionnaires about epistemic emotions and
attitudes towards GMFs. These variables were measured using the following instruments: the
Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI), the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales (EES), and the
Attitudes about GMFs survey. The results did not indicate a predictive relationship between
epistemic beliefs and emotions or attitudes towards GMFs. However, a significant predictive
relationship between negative epistemic emotions and negative attitudes towards GMFs was
found. As a result, the null hypothesis was rejected, and the regression analysis yielded a
significant effect size. The contribution of these findings to the scholarly literature, as well as
their practical implications, is discussed.
Keywords: attitudes, socio-scientific issue (SSI), genetically modified foods (GMFs),
epistemic beliefs, epistemic emotions
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
Overview
The interaction of epistemic beliefs and emotions in science education is a growing field
of research. Such research is typically carried out using scientific topics with strong societal
impact, known as socio-scientific issues (SSIs). However, while a growing body of research has
explored epistemic beliefs and emotions, as well as attitudes towards SSIs, few have addressed
the interaction of all three factors. The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of epistemic
beliefs on epistemic emotions and attitudes towards genetically modified foods (GMFs). This
chapter will summarize the historical and theoretical background for this topic and establish the
problem that warrants this research. Next, the purpose of the study and its significance will be
discussed. The chapter will conclude by outlining the research questions and defining key terms.
Background
The use of SSIs as interventions in science education has been studied extensively,
particularly in college classrooms. SSIs allow students to interact with pressing issues and apply
scientific concepts to them. Common examples include evolution, climate change, and GMFs
(Borgerding et al., 2017; Dinsmore et al., 2017; Heddy et al., 2017; Muis et al., 2015; Potter et
al., 2017). Much of this research has sought to address the conceptual factors behind student
understanding. For example, Coley and Tanner (2015) found that agreement with scientific
misconceptions about evolution were fairly persistent, even among biology majors. Other studies
have sought to address attitudes towards SSIs by addressing such misconceptions. To that end,
refutation texts have been used to correct common misconceptions about SSIs and have
correlated to more positive attitudes and more effective learning strategies (Heddy et al., 2017;
Muis, Sinatra et al., 2018). When used in conjunction with persuasive texts, such strategies have
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shown particular promise in fostering conceptual and attitude change about GMFs (Muis et al.,
2020; Thacker et al., 2020).
The correlation between conceptual understanding and attitudes about GMFs has also
been observed in survey data. Genetically modified (GM) crops have been evaluated as safe by
the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) as well as the National
Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) (AAAS, 2013; NASEM, 2016).
When surveyed, 88% of AAAS members responded that GM crops are safe to eat. However, in
the same survey, only 37% of American adults responded thusly, demonstrating a 51% gap
between public and scientist attitudes (Pew Research Center, 2015). In a series of surveys,
skepticism of GMFs increased sharply among American adults in just two years. In 2016, 39%
responded that GMFs were worse for health than other foods, which rose to 49% by 2018 and to
51% in 2020 (Funk, 2020; Kennedy et al., 2018; Pew Research Center, 2016). However, this
disapproval grew primarily among those with lower levels of scientific literacy, while those with
higher levels did not change substantially (Kennedy et al., 2018). An international study also
showed a strong correlation between GMF skepticism and a lack of literacy regarding GM
technology (McPhetres et al., 2019). These attitudes are not only indicative of the state of
scientific literacy but indicate opposition to technology with significant benefits for human
health and the environment. GM crops have the capacity to reduce insecticide use, produce more
food on less land, and combat vitamin A deficiency in the developing world (Clark & Tilman,
2017; Dively et al., 2018; Regis, 2019).
However, attitudes towards SSIs are not simply conceptual in nature, but also rely on
beliefs about the nature of knowledge known as epistemic beliefs. In their literature review of
inquiry methods, Fang et al. (2019) noted a trend of epistemic beliefs strongly influencing on
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evidence-based reasoning. The theory of conceptual change, described by Posner et al. (1982),
provides the framework for this understanding. This theory was inspired in part by Thomas
Kuhn’s (1970) seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which describes the
process of paradigm shifts in the history of scientific research, such as the transition from
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. Posner et al. (1982) note similarities between these transitions
and the reassessment of conceptual understanding in individuals. When a student encounters new
information, they may either assimilate it into their current conception or reorder their
conception in order to accommodate the new information. This conceptual change is driven by
governing concepts, including epistemic beliefs and prior knowledge. Epistemic beliefs can be
described in a variety of ways, including Perry developmental levels of dualist, multiplist,
relativist, and dialectical. In this paradigm, students generally begin with more absolutist beliefs
(dualists). But as they develop, they become more open to other perspectives and subjective
explanations (multiplists and relativists), eventually becoming more comfortable with
uncertainty and relativism (dialectical) (Borgerding et al., 2017; Rosman & Mayer, 2018).
Another way to categorize epistemic beliefs is through informal patterns of reasoning
known as cognitive construals. These cognitive construals can serve as helpful linguistic
shorthand, but often reinforce biological misconceptions (Richard et al., 2017). For example,
essentialism is the belief that an underlying aspect of an item defines its essence and cannot be
modified without redefining that item. Essentialist reasoning has been correlated with a greater
degree of biological misconceptions (Coley & Tanner, 2015; Richard et al., 2017; Stern et al.,
2018). Such misconceptions are particularly apparent with the topic of GMFs (Potter et al.,
2017). Epistemic beliefs can also be described in a more detailed and multidimensional way.
These dimensions include beliefs about the simplicity of knowledge, the certainty of knowledge,
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the source of knowledge, the innate ability to learn, and the speed of learning (Bullock, 2018).
Beliefs related to these types of factors range from more constructivist to less constructivist, and
have been used in research in science education (Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018). For example,
belief that knowledge is certain and that learning relies on the learner’s innate ability was
correlated with poor ability to construct arguments concerning SSIs (Ozturk & Yilmaz-Tuzun,
2017).
In addition to conceptual and belief factors, students’ attitudes towards SSIs are also
affected by emotional factors. Emotions and attitudes are dictated by a number of factors,
including individual values, which play an important role in SSI decision making (Fang et al.,
2019). In his control-value theory of emotion, Pekrun (2006) described the factors affecting
activity-related and outcome emotions. Pekrun posited that emotional response was dictated by
the perceived influence students have on their outcome (control) and the relevance the topic has
on them personally (value). Particularly relevant in science education, epistemic emotions are
those that result from evaluation of information and can dictate future learning (Muis, Chevrier
et al., 2018). Common epistemic emotions include curiosity, surprise, enjoyment, anxiety,
confusion, frustration, and boredom (Pekrun et al., 2017). Such emotions can have an activating
or deactivating effect, and have been shown to impact learning strategies and outcomes. Muis et
al. (2015) found that positive epistemic emotions predict deeper processing and critical thinking
among college students engaging with conflicting information about climate change. In a similar
study, Chevrier et al. (2019) demonstrated how surprise drives more critical thinking and how
curiosity leads to greater self-reflection.
Historically, research into SSIs has largely focused on “cold” intellectual factors, but
more studies are recognizing the relevance of the “hot” factors of emotions to such topics
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(Rosman & Mayer, 2018). The resulting “warming trend” has driven more research interest into
the interaction of beliefs and emotions (Leonard et al., 2014; Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016). When
students encounter conflicting information, their epistemic beliefs inform their emotional
response. Muis et al., (2015) found that students with more constructivist epistemic beliefs
showed lower levels of negative emotions, such as confusion, anxiety, and boredom. They also
showed higher levels of positive emotions, such as enjoyment and curiosity. Similarly, Chevrier
et al. (2019) demonstrated that more constructivist students showed greater curiosity and less
boredom.
Emotions also inform the formation of attitudes, which are general appraisals or
judgments of a particular subject and may be positive or negative (Heddy et al., 2017). In
conjunction with the aforementioned “warming trend”, Sinatra and Seyranian (2016) proposed a
framework of attitude/conceptual change. In this model, the accuracy of a participant’s
conceptions is compared with their attitude for or against the topic at hand. Correcting
misconceptions can result in conceptual change from inaccurate to accurate understanding of the
topic. However, Sinatra and Seyranian (2016) also proposed that conceptual change could result
in a change in attitude from opposition to support. This was demonstrated experimentally by
Heddy et al. (2017), who studied students’ attitudes towards GMFs. The results indicated that
correcting misconceptions using a refutation text resulted in more positive attitudes towards
GMFs. Thacker et al. (2020) further established the role of epistemic emotions in mediating
change in attitudes towards GMFs. Epistemic beliefs and judgments have also been shown to
impact epistemic emotions related to GMFs (Muis et al., 2020, 2021).
In summary, attitudes towards SSIs are subject to influence from conceptual
understanding, epistemic beliefs, and emotions. Refutation texts are a common tool used to
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correct misconceptions, which can lead to attitude change (Heddy et al., 2017; Muis, Sinatra et
al., 2018). Epistemic beliefs impact student interaction with and application of scientific
concepts, and can lead to more accurate conceptions (Posner et al., 1982; Potter et al., 2017).
Moreover, epistemic beliefs affect epistemic emotions, which drive students’ reaction to
conflicting information and learning strategies (Chevrier et al., 2019; Muis et al., 2015). Finally,
conceptual change has also been shown to result in attitude change, which is mediated by
emotional change (Heddy et al., 2017; Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016; Thacker et al., 2020).
Problem Statement
Several studies have addressed the topics of epistemic belief, epistemic emotion, and
attitudes towards SSIs among undergraduate students (Chevrier et al., 2019; Heddy et al., 2017;
Muis et al., 2015; Rosman & Mayer, 2018). However, the interaction between each of these
factors has not been studied. The impact of epistemic beliefs on epistemic emotions has been
documented among college students, but not regarding SSIs (Rosman & Mayer, 2018). Studies
centered on SSIs have largely focused on climate change and have gone on to discuss the
consequences of such emotions on learning strategies and outcomes (Chevrier et al., 2019; Muis
et al., 2015). Similarly, the impact of epistemic beliefs on attitudes has been addressed, but only
towards science in general among education undergraduate students (Bullock, 2018).
This field of inquiry is ripe for further study (Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016). The
relationship between emotional change and attitude change has been theorized (Petty & Briñol,
2015) and modeled in the attitude/conceptual change framework (Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016).
Moreover, this interaction has been studied concerning college students’ attitudes toward GMFs
(Heddy et al., 2017; Muis et al., 2020; Thacker et al., 2020). However, only one study has
explored the role of prior epistemic beliefs in relation to epistemic emotions surrounding GMFs,
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and this study did not address attitude change (Muis et al., 2021). There is a gap in the research
literature concerning the effects of epistemic beliefs and emotions on attitudes towards GMFs.
In summary, much research has explored the effects of epistemic beliefs on emotions.
Other studies have addressed conceptual and attitude change towards SSIs. The problem is that
the role of epistemic beliefs on emotions and attitude towards GMFs has not been thoroughly
explored. Enhanced understanding of this relationship would allow more targeted science
education regarding the topic of GMFs, as well as other controversial SSIs.
Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of epistemic beliefs on epistemic
emotions and attitudes towards GMFs. This was accomplished using a quantitative, predictive
correlational design to assess the interaction between these three variables. Epistemic beliefs are
beliefs about the nature of knowledge and its acquisition (Schraw et al., 2002). Epistemic
emotions are emotions related to the generation of knowledge and learning (Pekrun et al., 2017).
In contrast, an attitude is a general appraisal or judgment of a subject and may be positive or
negative (Heddy et al., 2017).
The study participants included 78 undergraduate students of various majors taking
introductory science courses. Participants were drawn from a large, private Christian university
in central Virginia. Participants completed the aforementioned measures in an online survey
format, and also read a refutation text designed to correct common misconceptions about GMFs,
as well as a persuasive text highlighting their advantages (Thacker et al., 2020).
This study assessed epistemic beliefs and epistemic emotions. Epistemic beliefs were
measured using the Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI) and served as one of the predictor variables
(Schommer, 1990; Schraw et al., 2002). Epistemic emotions were measured using the
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Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales (EES), serving as both predictor and criterion variables in
different research questions (Pekrun et al., 2017). Attitudes towards GMFs, were measured using
Heddy et al.’s (2017) Attitudes about GMFs survey and served as a criterion variable.
Significance of the Study
An examination of the relationship between epistemic beliefs and emotions on attitudes
towards GMFs adds to the body of knowledge concerning the role of these factors in SSI
instruction. This study further clarifies the consequences of epistemic emotions studied by Muis
et al. (2015) and Chevrier et al., (2019). Moreover, it complements the findings of Heddy et al.,
(2017) by addressing the impact of epistemic beliefs on attitudes towards GMFs. These findings
yielded implications for future study of emotional change and attitude change, as well as the use
of refutation texts to promote such change (Heddy et al., 2017; Muis, Sinatra et al., 2018).
This study also had practical significance for instruction, building on other studies that
show positive epistemic emotions resulting in more effective learning strategies (Chevrier et al.,
2019; Muis et al., 2015). The results of this study can provide a basis for development of future
instructional practices that factor in epistemic beliefs and emotions. Furthermore, it expands on
the research of Potter et al. (2017), who addressed the connection between epistemic beliefs and
GMF misconceptions. The overarching goal is to further clarify student conceptions and attitudes
towards GMFs in order to help create more scientifically literate citizens.
Research Questions
RQ1: Do epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students predict epistemic emotions
following refutation of common misconceptions about GMFs?
RQ2: Do epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students predict attitudes towards GMFs
following refutation of common misconceptions?
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RQ3: Do epistemic emotions of undergraduate students predict attitudes towards GMFs
following refutation of common misconceptions?
Definitions
1. Attitude – An attitude is a general appraisal or judgment of a subject and may be
positive or negative (Heddy et al., 2017).
2. Epistemic beliefs – Epistemic beliefs are beliefs about the nature of knowledge and its
acquisition (Schraw et al., 2002).
3. Epistemic emotions – Epistemic emotions are emotions related to the generation of
knowledge and learning (Pekrun et al., 2017).
4. Genetically modified food (GMF) – Genetically modified foods are those produced
using organisms whose genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur
naturally (World Health Organization, 2014).
5. Socio-scientific issues (SSIs) – Socio-scientific issues are scientific topics or
dilemmas of particular social interest (Sadler, 2004).
6. Cognitive construals – Cognitive construals are a type of informal reasoning based on
intuitive patterns of thought (Coley & Tanner, 2015)
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
Overview
The purpose of this study is to examine the effects of epistemic beliefs on epistemic
emotions and attitudes towards GMFs. The factors that determine how college students approach
SSIs, such as GMFs, have garnered much attention in the academic literature. This literature has
been systematically reviewed with an emphasis on the role of beliefs and emotions in dictating
students’ attitudes and views regarding such issues. First, the theory of conceptual change will be
discussed along with the control-value theory of emotion, both of which build the theoretical
framework. The relevant literature will then be synthesized regarding primary types of informal
reasoning, such as epistemic beliefs and construal-based reasoning. Next, the role of emotions in
science learning, particularly while encountering conflicting information, will be addressed.
Finally, the current state of understanding regarding the interplay of beliefs and emotions will be
explored, including view complexity and the models of conceptual and attitude change. While
much research has explored these factors, few have sought to assess the impact of epistemic
beliefs and emotions on attitudes towards GMFs. This present study seeks to address this gap in
the literature.
Theoretical Framework
Students’ attitudes towards SSIs are dependent on a variety of factors. This framework
will serve to outline the foundational theories of conceptual change and evaluation, particularly
related to scientific controversies. Posner et al.'s (1982) theory of conceptual change described
cognitive accommodation as a factor of properties of the students’ conceptual ecology. On the
other hand, Pekrun (2006) addressed the emotional factor with his control-value theory of
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emotion, positing that learning drives emotional responses through a student’s appraisals of
control and value.
Theory of Conceptual Change
Studying SSIs often requires students to reevaluate their preconceptions and, at times,
revise their beliefs. Posner et al. (1982) provided a theoretical framework for such conceptual
change and the conditions required to foster it within students. This theory was inspired by
Thomas Kuhn's (1970) seminal book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which describes
the process of paradigm shifts in the history of scientific research, such as the move from
Newtonian to Einsteinian physics. Posner et al. note similarities between these transitions and the
replacement of concepts in individuals. When a student encounters new information, they may
either assimilate it into their current conception or reorder their conception in order to
accommodate the new information. According to Posner et al. (1982), accommodation requires
careful assessment of both current and new concepts. The student must be dissatisfied with their
current conception’s ability to make sense of the information and must recognize the
intelligibility and plausibility of a new concept. Finally, this replacement concept should also
potentially allow for productive research ventures. These governing concepts are referred to as
the conceptual ecology, which is also characterized by epistemic beliefs, metaphysical beliefs,
other knowledge, and other cognitive conflicts called anomalies (Posner et al., 1982). This
conceptual ecology must be addressed in order for a student to update their conceptions and
attitudes about SSIs in light of new evidence. One key factor in such a reconsideration is the
evaluation of the plausibility of the new concept.
Building on Posner et al.’s (1982) classical conceptual change model, Lombardi et al.
(2016) proposed the Plausibility Judgments in Conceptual Change (PJCC) model. According to
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this model, humans innately pre-process new claims for validity based on background
knowledge, the complexity of new explanations, and perceptions of the certainty and credibility
of the source. Because such judgments are made implicitly, prior conceptions are prone to persist
because of their perceived plausibility. However, according to the PJCC model, previous
conceptions can be reappraised through critical evaluation of alternative explanations (Lombardi,
Nussbaum, et al., 2016).
Control-Value Theory of Emotion
Students’ attitudes about SSIs are influenced by intellectual and emotional factors. Posner
et al.’s (1982) theory provided a framework for understanding conceptual change; but it only
addressed the formal intellectual basis informing such change. Emotions also play a significant
role in students’ interactions with new knowledge, particularly when it challenges their
preconceptions. Pekrun (2006) posited that learning has positive and negative effects on
emotions, which were categorized as activity-related and outcome emotions. His control-value
theory of emotion argued that this influence is mediated by appraisals of students’ perceived
control over the learning outcome as well as the personal value they placed on the subject.
Furthermore, individual personality antecedents have the capacity to influence the process,
which is subject to interplay and feedback mechanisms (Pekrun, 2006).
Pekrun’s work formed the foundation for other theoretical models that sought to explain
the interplay between epistemic beliefs and emotions. In her model of epistemic beliefs and selfregulated learning, Muis (2007) posited that epistemic beliefs serve as epistemological standards,
which inform student motivation to learning activities. However, this model did not incorporate
the role of epistemic emotions. On the other hand, Bendixen and Rule (2004) argued that
cognitive incongruity, or disequilibrium, drives changes in epistemic beliefs by inducing
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epistemic emotions. In their cognitive incongruity model of epistemic beliefs and emotions, Muis
et al. (2015) brought these factors together, positing that epistemic beliefs impact epistemic
emotions, which in turn affect learning strategies and outcomes. According to this integrative
model, when a student encounters complex material, such as SSIs, this can trigger cognitive
incongruity with their prior epistemic beliefs. This incongruity informs the resulting epistemic
emotional response, which influences the learning strategies used to process the conflicting
material and the resulting outcomes (Muis et al., 2015). These models have been used to inform
empirical research and can be further applied to educational practice, particularly related to SSIs.
Related Literature
SSIs are socially and scientifically embedded topics and are commonly used to help
students apply scientific concepts to real-world situations. Examples of SSIs include climate
change, acceptance of evolution, nuclear power, and genetically modified organisms (GMOs),
particularly in agriculture (Borgerding et al., 2017; Dinsmore et al., 2017; Heddy et al., 2017;
Muis et al., 2015; Ozturk & Yilmaz-Tuzun, 2017; Potter et al., 2017). In a review of the SSI
literature, Sadler (2004) argued that they can be important interventions for the development of
informal reasoning. While not a panacea, SSIs also provide opportunities for students to develop
epistemic cognition and argumentation skills (Sadler, 2004).
However, despite extensive research into the use of SSIs as interventions, the factors
affecting students’ attitudes towards them have not been as thoroughly described. In their
literature review, Fang et al. (2019) established a framework for conceptualizing student decision
making about SSIs. They found that most studies focused on articulating a decision-making
space and addressed themes of evidence-based and informal reasoning. On the other hand, far
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fewer studies have addressed the establishment of a decision-making strategy or the reflection on
that process (Fang et al., 2019).
SSIs are of interest specifically because of their embeddedness within society, which
means that they are not simply conceptual topics. Rather, the study of SSIs often requires
appraisals of epistemic beliefs (Chevrier et al., 2019). The role of emotions must also be
considered, including the way people assess risk (Loewenstein et al., 2001) and new information
which conflicts with their prior understanding (Bendixen & Rule, 2004).
Genetically Modified Foods (GMFs)
While several SSIs have been studied, the topic of GMFs raises particular interest due to
the strong public reaction to it, and the abundance of controversy it incites. The World Health
Organization (2014) defines genetically modified organisms (GMOs) as plants, animals, or
microorganisms “in which the genetic material (DNA) has been altered in a way that does not
occur naturally by mating and/or natural recombination” (World Health Organization, 2014,
para. 1). While there is some innate ambiguity with the term, a “GMO” typically refers to an
organism that is transgenic, meaning it contains genes from another species (Dively et al., 2018).
Because the term “GMO” can apply to biotechnological applications in a variety of disciplines
“GMF” is here used to focus on the agricultural context.
Genetically Modified (GM) crops provide a number of agricultural benefits, including
resistance to pests, herbicides, disease and drought, as well as extreme cold and salinity
(Whitman, 2000). These innovations allow greater yield and less crop loss for farmers around the
world. One prominent example is Bt corn, which has been modified to include a gene from the
bacterium Bacillis thuringensis, from which it gets its name. This gene allows the corn to
produce a chemical that is toxic to pests such as corn borers, but not to humans or other animals
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(Dively et al., 2018). Dively et al. (2018) analyzed 40 years of data and found that the use of Bt
corn regularly reduced harmful pests and crop damage, as well as a 41% reduction in insecticide
use. Through these types of benefits, GM crops also allow greater yield, meaning more food can
be grown on less land. In a meta-analysis of 90 crops over several hundred sites, Clark and
Tilman (2017) found that land use was higher for crops grown using conventional agricultural
techniques, including genetic engineering, when compared to crops grown organically.
While these types of studies show obvious agricultural benefit of GM crops, the question
of GMF safety is a separate matter. Public concern regarding safety of GMFs is focused on the
perception that they cause allergic reactions or illness (Rose et al., 2020). However, the scientific
evidence for this concern has not been borne out. In 2016, the National Academies of Science,
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) reviewed the scientific literature for safety of GM crops
and found no compelling evidence that they are correlated with adverse health risks. In fact, the
authors cited the benefits of reducing insecticide poisoning, as well as the development of GM
crops with improved nutrition (NASEM, 2016). Additionally, the use of Bt corn has been found
to reduce fungal toxins in corn by 90% (Dively et al., 2018). An excellent example of improved
nutrition is the development of “Golden Rice”, which includes a gene from daffodils that allows
the rice to produce beta-carotene, a vital precursor in vitamin A formation. This crop was
modified to treat vitamin A deficiency, which results in over 500,000 cases of blindness per year
in the developing world (Regis, 2019).
Given the agricultural benefits and safety advantages of GM crops, it is unsurprising that
they are largely considered safe by the scientific community. For example, the board of directors
of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) released in a statement
that the evidence for the safety of GM crops was clear (AAAS, 2013). In a 2015 survey of
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AAAS members by the Pew Research Center, 88% of the scientists surveyed responded that it
was safe to eat GM foods (Pew Research Center, 2015).
However, the same survey showed the disconnect between scientists and the general
public on this issue. When asked whether GM foods were safe to eat, only 37% of United States
adults responded thusly. This represents the largest gap (51%) between public and scientists’
perceptions of any of the SSIs surveyed, including climate change, vaccines, and evolution (Pew
Research Center, 2015). In a 2016 survey, 39% of American adults viewed GMFs as worse for
human health than other foods (Pew Research Center, 2016). This minority became more
sizeable, with 49% of adults responding thusly to a 2018 survey (Kennedy et al., 2018),
representing a ten-point uptick in just two years. Two years after that, this proportion reached a
majority of 51% (Funk, 2020). This public distrust is not limited to the United States. A study of
public perceptions of GMFs across 20 countries found that 48% of those surveyed viewed them
as worse for human health. Only 13% of respondents said they were safe to eat, with sizeable
percentages in each country saying they did not know enough to respond to answer (Kennedy &
Thigpen, 2020).
While public opposition is not uncommon surrounding controversial scientific topics, this
trend is particularly interesting because of the disparity between the views of scientists and the
public. This public perception has resulted in the advent of mandatory labeling of GMFs in the
United States (Prentice, 2018), despite the opposition to this effort by both the AAAS (2013) and
NASEM (2016). Moreover, the opposition to GMFs in western developed nations stalled the
adoption of “Golden Rice” for over 20 years, despite its capacity to improve the health of
millions in the developing world (Regis, 2019).
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The reasons for this disconnect between scientific and public attitudes towards GMFs are
likely multifaceted. One possibility is a series of common misconceptions. Many are under the
mistaken impression that GMFs involve cloning or hormone injection, which is not the case
(Broughton et al., 2012). Another misconception is that GMFs are unnatural, making them
dangerous for human consumption. However, modern agriculture is marked by selective
breeding, resulting in domesticated crops that bear virtually no resemblance to their wild
counterparts. Furthermore, recent studies have shown that transgenic crops are also found in
nature. Matveeva and Otten (2019) found that 7% of dicots, a major group of flowering plants,
were naturally transgenic, a much larger proportion than was previously known to undergo this
process in nature.
Another reason for the difference in perception may be due to public underestimation of
the scientific consensus surrounding the issue of genetic modification. This may be the result of
journalistic “false balance” often found in media articles on the topic. The journalistic practice of
presenting both sides of a controversy has been shown to give the false impression that both
sides are equally supported. In a series of experiments, Koehler (2016) showed that false balance
distorted the perception of participants regarding topics that had expert consensus.
While there are many possible factors behind this phenomenon, some common players
are notably missing. Unlike other controversial SSIs, negative attitudes about GMFs do not fall
neatly along political, demographic, or religious lines (Pew Research Center, 2016). Political
affiliation is known to be a predictor of attitudes regarding climate change, and religion has been
shown to be a factor in attitudes towards vaccination, but neither trend applies to negative GMF
attitudes (Rutjens et al., 2018). Rather, research has shown that epistemic beliefs and emotions
play a role in conceptualization and attitudes towards GMFs. The following review of the
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relevant literature will shed light on the interplay of these factors their effect on attitudes towards
GMFs.
Informal Reasoning
According to Posner et al.'s (1982) theory of conceptual change, students evaluate new
concepts based on both formal and informal, or intuitive, reasoning. They specifically cite
epistemic commitments, beliefs concerning nature of knowledge, as a factor needed for
conceptual change. Rönnebeck et al. (2016), in their literature review of inquiry methods, also
noted a need for further research into the effects of epistemic considerations in inquiry-based
strategies. In a study of preservice science teachers, Ozturk and Yilmaz-Tuzun (2017) found that
informal reasoning hindered them from making strong arguments for their views about SSIs.
Research into informal SSI reasoning has primarily focused on epistemic beliefs and construalbased reasoning.
Epistemic Beliefs
In their review of literature concerning SSI decision making, Fang et al. (2019) noted a
trend of epistemic beliefs strongly influencing evidence-based reasoning. Epistemic beliefs
inform epistemic cognition, the consideration of knowledge-related aspects and the way they are
used (Greene et al., 2016). Epistemic cognition has also been linked to high academic
achievement. Greene et al. (2018) performed a meta-analysis of literature related to epistemic
cognition and found a small but significant correlation with academic achievement. Further
analysis indicated that this increase is more strongly correlated with conceptual understanding
and argumentation than with procedural activities, suggesting added gains for critical thinking
skills (Greene et al., 2018). These findings are consistent with Posner et al.'s (1982) evaluation of
epistemic beliefs as a component of the conceptual ecology. Muis (2007) built on Posner et al.’s
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theoretical foundation by proposing that such beliefs influence students’ academic goals and
serve as epistemological standards for cognition. Such beliefs typically go unstated by students
but have profound impact on their ability to engage with scientific evidence.
Epistemic belief can be categorized using broad developmental categories. These stages
were established in Perry's (1970) book about intellectual development among college students,
resulting in the following Perry levels: dualist, multiplist, relativist, and dialectical. Dualists, also
called absolutists, are seen to hold a more simplistic view that all questions have objective
answers that are passively received from an intellectual authority. Multiplists and relativists are
characterized by increasing levels of subjectivity, prioritizing opinions and perspectives over
facts. Dialectical students take a stronger commitment to relativism, having become comfortable
with uncertainty (Rosman & Mayer, 2018). Rosman and Mayer (2018) further distinguish
evaluatism as a stage which straddles the line between absolutism and subjectivity by judging
claims as tentatively certain or uncertain.
Other models of epistemic beliefs are more multidimensional, breaking down epistemic
beliefs to discrete categories. Hofer and Pintrich (1997) proposed four belief categories; the
former two (certainty knowledge and source of knowledge) describe beliefs about knowledge,
while the latter two (simplicity of knowledge and justification of knowledge) describe beliefs
about the process of knowing. Other models incorporate the ability of students to learn, as well
as the speed of learning (Bullock, 2018; Schommer, 1990; Schraw et al., 2002). Along these
factors, epistemic beliefs range from less constructivist to more constructivist. The view that
knowledge is simple, acquired from authority figures, certain, and should be uncritically
accepted is less constructivist. On the other hand, viewing knowledge as complex, actively
constructed, tentative information that must be critically evaluated is more constructivist (Muis,
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Chevrier et al., 2018). Ozturk and Yilmaz-Tuzun (2017) used such categories to explore the
relationship between epistemic beliefs and informal reasoning about nuclear power. In this study,
647 Turkish preservice science teachers were surveyed about their epistemic beliefs and made
arguments to defend their views on nuclear power. The results indicated that belief that
knowledge is absolutely certain, that the ability to learn is innate and only possessed by some,
and that learning occurs quickly were correlated with poor argument construction (Ozturk &
Yilmaz-Tuzun, 2017).
Furthermore, epistemic beliefs have been investigated as they differ within and between
disciplines. Muis et al. (2016) sampled students from high school, undergraduate, and graduate
school in order to understand their epistemic beliefs within and between academic domains. Selfreport and interview data indicated differences between domain-general and domain-specific
beliefs and that, while beliefs between domains were related, unique attributes still arose among
them. For example, most students held absolutist beliefs concerning mathematics but multiplist
beliefs about psychology and general knowledge. This suggests that students are more likely to
deny certainty and be skeptical of experts in psychological domains than in mathematics. The
results also indicated that most epistemic beliefs were informed by prior experience (Muis et al.,
2016). However, one limitation of Muis et al.’s (2016) results is their reliance on self-report
measures. Nonetheless, this pattern of experience as a basis for epistemic beliefs is consistent
with Posner et al.’s (1982) evaluation of the conceptual ecology.
Epistemic beliefs inform the way an individual conceptualizes a particular topic, such as
the theory of evolution. Borgerding et al. (2017) studied the relationship between epistemic
beliefs and acceptance of the theory of evolution among 395 upper-level and first-year biology
majors, as well as nonmajors. Through quantitative surveys, individual interviews, and a learning
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content questionnaire, the researchers evaluated students by Perry levels, year, and epistemic
beliefs. They found that acceptance of evolution increased by year and age, as well as with more
relativist and dialectical beliefs. The qualitative results contextualized this pattern based on their
views of authority, religion, and the tentative nature of scientific findings (Borgerding et al.,
2017). Epistemic beliefs clearly have a profound influence on students’ attitudes towards SSIs.
Construal-based Reasoning
Epistemic beliefs also inform patterns of informal reasoning referred to as cognitive
construals. These construals can serve as helpful linguistic shorthand, but often reinforce
biological misconceptions (Richard et al., 2017). Because they are a form of intuitive reasoning,
students do not often realize they are using construals. Therefore, to measure their use
researchers must code students’ answers to open-ended questions based on the presence of
linguistic markers. These codes are then compared with the other variables at play, including
agreement with misconceptions or attitudes about the topic at hand (Blancke et al., 2015; Coley
& Tanner, 2015; Pope et al., 2017; Potter et al., 2017; Richard et al., 2017; Shtulman et al., 2020;
Stern et al., 2018).
One example is anthropocentrism, wherein the student inappropriately applies human
analogies to other organisms or distorts humans’ place in nature. This has led some students to
falsely apply concepts of choice and volition to processes like natural selection, particularly with
antibiotic resistance in bacteria (Richard et al., 2017). Another typical construal is teleological
thinking, which is based around a human bias towards causal explanations. Using teleological
thinking, some students apply concepts of goal and purpose to natural processes that are actually
driven by chance. Both of these construals have also been linked with student agreement with
biological misconceptions (Coley & Tanner, 2015; Richard et al., 2017; Stern et al., 2018).
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Another example is essentialism, the belief that an underlying property of an organism
dictates its core identity (Coley & Tanner, 2015). Essentialists believe that this if this underlying
property would be altered, it would undermine or redefine the identity of the organism. For
example, if DNA is seen as the blueprint of life, without regard for the complications of genetic
regulatory processes, the idea of genetic modification is seen as altering the subject’s core
essence rather than simply altering one aspect of an organism. This type of thinking has been
linked to misconceptions about biology, namely regarding GMFs (Potter et al., 2017).
The use of such construals has been studied in the context of GMF attitudes, namely
essentialism and teleological thinking. In an experiment assessing food preferences through
parent-child conversations, the participants relied more heavily on moral language than on
knowledge claims. One proposed reasoning for this reliance is that the use of genetic
modification of food was seen as a violation of the essence (essentialism) and purpose
(teleology) of the food products (Shtulman et al., 2020). The use of biotechnology to produce
transgenic organisms is often seen as a corruption of the essence of the organism. When
surveyed, more than half of respondents believed that a tomato modified with a fish gene would
taste like fish. This essentialist view of transgenic organisms as bizarre hybrids has even been
harnessed by anti-GMF activists in their promotional literature. Additionally, many hold the
perception that altering the genome of an organism is an affront to the way crops are meant to be
produced (Blancke et al., 2015). Those holding to this teleological view often accuse scientists of
“playing God”, a common phrase that has been closely associated with intuitive informal
reasoning about biotechnology. In a study of Australian high school students, Pope et al. (2017)
explored the impacts of religious beliefs on students’ views of biotechnology SSIs, including
GMFs, genetic screening, and cloning. The results indicated that students holding to a Christian
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worldview relied more heavily on intuitive reasoning than rational reasoning, specifically
arguments marked by essentialism and teleology (Pope et al., 2017).
The inappropriate use of construals has also been shown to persist through formal science
education. As with Borgerding et al.’s (2017) study, these examples have been studied in nonbiology majors (NBM), entering biology majors (EBM), advanced biology majors (ABM) and in
faculty. Research has found that most students studied across these groups showed similar use of
essentialist reasoning (Potter et al., 2017; Richard et al., 2017). However, misconceptions among
NBM were higher than in biology majors (Coley & Tanner, 2015). Furthermore, ABM showed
only moderately lower agreement with misconceptions compared with NBM and EBM (Richard
et al., 2017). A similar study in Switzerland found that 97% of participants agreed with at least
one misconception and that there was consistent agreement with the use of construals in openended questions (Stern et al., 2018). Much like Coley and Tanner’s (2015) results, Stern et al.
(2018) found that there was no correlation between teleological and essentialist misconceptions.
However, Coley and Tanner’s (2015) results showed specific and precise connections between
reasoning and misconceptions, suggesting that formal education might be unintentionally
reinforcing such misconceptions and use of construal-based reasoning. On the other hand,
Richard et al. (2017) found significant association across all construals for the groups studied,
suggesting that formal training may not reify these trends.
Emotions
In addition to the use of cognitive construals, attitudes about GMFs are often shaped by
emotional arguments (Blancke et al., 2015; Pope et al., 2017; Shtulman et al., 2020). Research in
science education and communication has long focused on the “cold” cognitive and conceptual
bases of students’ views and decision-making about scientific issues (Engelmann et al., 2016;
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Posner et al., 1982). However, recently more studies have addressed the importance of the “hot”
factors of emotions and attitudes (Pekrun, 2006; Petty & Briñol, 2015; Rosman & Mayer, 2018).
In this “warming” trend, more researchers are seeking to understand the relationship between
beliefs, emotions, and attitudes related to SSIs (Leonard et al., 2014).
Emotions are complex, multifaceted psychological processes. Science education
particularly interfaces with epistemic emotions, which result from information-based appraisals,
and can inform future educational efforts (Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018). Emotions may be general
across academic domains, specific to a particular academic domain, or specific to a particular
topic. While science education is largely concerned with topic-specific emotions, all three
categories show interplay with one another. In contrast to emotions, attitudes are overall
evaluations of a subject (i.e. object, topic, person, or event). Attitudes are informed by emotions,
and can be valenced, or oriented, either positively or negatively with regard to the subject (Maio
& Haddock, 2010). Emotions and attitudes are dictated by a number of factors, including
individual values, which play an important role in attitudes towards SSI (Fang et al., 2019).
Epistemic Emotions
Epistemic emotions include curiosity, surprise, enjoyment, anxiety, confusion,
frustration, and boredom (Pekrun et al., 2017). Such academic emotions are largely driven by the
appraisals of control and value, according to the control-value theory of emotion (Pekrun, 2006).
Muis et al. include the novelty and complexity of new information as antecedents to emotions.
Additionally, the achievement or impasse of an academic goal also has a role in informing
emotion (Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018).
Emotions also result in several consequences, which can facilitate or hinder future
learning. These consequences include planning and setting of goals, motivation on future
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assignments, cognitive strategies, learning outcomes, and revisions to prior beliefs (Muis,
Chevrier et al., 2018). As part of the control-value theory of emotion, Pekrun (2006) posited that
emotions could be categorized by their valence as positive or negative, and by their role in
activating or deactivating the student towards future action. For example, enjoyment is a positive
activating emotion, while relief is a positive deactivating emotion. Similarly, anger is a negative
activating emotion, while boredom is a negative deactivating emotion (Pekrun, 2006).
The influence of emotions on learning strategies and outcomes has also been measured.
Chevrier et al. (2019) found that positive epistemic emotions predicted more effective learning
strategies. Specifically, curiosity resulted in greater metacognitive self-reflection and surprise
resulted in more critical thinking and less simple rehearsal (Chevrier et al., 2019). Muis et al.
(2015) also found that positive epistemic emotions positively correlated with deeper processing
strategies and critical thinking. On the other hand, negative emotions correlated negatively with
deep processing strategies, and positively with shallow strategies, such as simple rehearsal or
memorization (Muis et al., 2015). While Chevrier et al. (2019) relied on self-report measures,
Muis et al. (2015) measured these emotions using a novel instrument, called the EpistemicallyRelated Emotion Scales (EES). This reliable and valid instrument is easier, less invasive, and
more cost-effective than more observational alternatives, and allows for easier quantification of
emotions (Pekrun et al., 2017).
Emotions and Conflict
Early models of decision making were based on a philosophy that viewed such decisions
as a simple analytical calculation (Posner et al., 1982). However, research from physiological
studies and clinical psychology demonstrate that emotional reactions tend to diverge from
conceptual assessment, particularly under conditions of risk or uncertainty. People evaluate risks
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both cognitively and emotionally, but the two differ greatly. Emotional evaluations in the face of
perceived risk, namely fear, do not require significant cognitive processing, or even an awareness
of what the person is afraid of. Emotions are also subject to imagery and imagination, and can
result in a discrepancy between the emotional and cognitive evaluations of risk (Loewenstein et
al., 2001). This pattern is particularly true of GMF safety, which involves assessment of both
benefits and risks. While a significant portion of the U.S. public perceives GMFs as risky, a
sizeable majority also recognize their benefits, including capability to increase the supply of food
and make it more affordable (Funk, 2020). In a study of U.S. adults, GMF rejection was
primarily linked with perceptions that they result in allergic reactions or illness. This study was
carried out in an agricultural state, which makes the degree of opposition more surprising (Rose
et al., 2020).
It is evident that the role of emotions in GMF attitudes is pivotal, particularly when
conflicting claims must be evaluated. Such evaluations also rely on epistemic beliefs. Bendixen
and Rule (2004) further built on Posner et al.’s (1982) theoretical foundation in their integrated
model of epistemic beliefs. They noted that incongruity arises when learners encounter
information that is inconsistent with their beliefs, which often results in negative epistemic
emotions. Such emotions are often viewed as harmful to learning goals, but some have argued
that such negative emotions can actually yield positive results. D’Mello and Graesser (2012) note
that these discrepancies cause cognitive disequilibrium, resulting in confusion, a negative
emotion. This confusion then has the opportunity to inform epistemic goals and, if resolved,
results in positive epistemic emotions. However, if the confusion remains unresolved, it can
result in further negative emotion, such as frustration (D’Mello et al., 2014; Muis, Chevrier et al.,
2018).
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The relationship between epistemic beliefs and emotions has been documented by
Rosman and Mayer (2018), who compared epistemic emotions with absolutist, multiplist, and
evaluatist beliefs in students. Their findings suggested that evaluatism is correlated with lower
negative epistemic emotions. Students with stronger evaluatist indicators showed lower levels of
confusion, surprise, and frustration when tasked with resolving conflicting claims. On the other
hand, students with stronger absolutist indicators showed higher levels of these negative
emotions (Rosman & Mayer, 2018).
By addressing the role of beliefs and emotions in evaluating conflicting information,
research has also demonstrated that it improves learning strategies and outcomes. The
dimensions of belief most commonly studied are the certainty, simplicity, source, and
justification of knowledge. Muis et al. (2015) studied the interplay of beliefs and emotions using
instruction about climate change, which was based on texts that differed according to these belief
dimensions. Their results showed that addressing two dimensions (justification and complexity)
predicted positive emotions of enjoyment and curiosity. However, they found that all four
dimensions predicted lower levels of negative emotions. As a result, if a student believes that
justifying claims about climate change requires critical evaluation of multiple sources, they are
likely to show greater levels of curiosity and enjoyment and lower levels of boredom.
Additionally, when students grasped the complexity of knowledge claims, along with the
tentativeness and active construction of knowledge, they showed lower levels of confusion,
anxiety, frustration, and boredom. These positive emotions were correlated with more effective
learning strategies and better academic outcomes (Muis et al., 2015).
These findings were further validated by Trevors et al. (2017), who also tested students
epistemic beliefs, emotions, and learning outcomes. In this study, participants were assessed for
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epistemic beliefs and emotions through the process of reading three conflicting texts about
climate change and writing summaries of them. The findings support the impact of beliefs on
emotions, which then influence learning outcomes. For example, students who viewed scientific
knowledge as passively acquired responded with confusion to conflicting information, resulting
in impairments during the experiment. On the other hand, students who view the science as a
process of inquiry responded with greater curiosity, which was shown to expedite learning
(Trevors et al., 2017). The findings of Chevrier et al. (2019) further confirmed this pattern. As
with the prior studies, students were evaluated for epistemic beliefs and emotions, and exposed
to conflicting information about climate change. Students with more constructivist beliefs at the
outset of the experiment reported greater degrees of curiosity and less surprise and boredom. The
emotional response also correlated with more critical thinking and higher learning achievement
(Chevrier et al., 2019).
Improvement of critical thinking was also observed when students were presented with
conflicting information about GMFs. Muis et al. (2021) studied the role of epistemic cognition
and emotions on critical thinking in undergraduate students. For this study, participants were
evaluated for knowledge on GMFs, as well as their epistemic beliefs. They were then presented
with information on the advantages and disadvantages of GMFs, assessed for epistemic
emotions, and wrote an argumentative essay. While the results indicated complex interactions
between these factors, a few trends stand out. Those with more constructivist beliefs about the
complexity of knowledge, justification of findings, and complexity of knowledge about GMFs
indicated more positive emotions. The acknowledgment of knowledge as complex and uncertain
was also predictive of critical thinking. Furthermore, while frustration in participants predicted
low critical thinking, confusion and anxiety actually predicted high critical thinking, suggesting
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that confusion served to motivate further learning (Muis et al., 2021). This finding is consistent
with previous findings (D’Mello et al., 2014; D’Mello & Graesser, 2012; Muis, Chevrier et al.,
2018).
The proposed reason for this relationship lies in the alignment of epistemic beliefs with
learning tasks. When students’ epistemic beliefs and the epistemic nature of the learning task are
well aligned, this results in more positive emotions such as curiosity. This congruity allows the
students to be well equipped to learn due to greater perceived control of their own learning. In
contrast, poor alignment of beliefs and learning task results in incongruity and a loss of perceived
control (Muis et al., 2015; Trevors et al., 2017). However, the novelty of the information can also
increase the perceived value to the student, which can have a positive impact on emotion,
consistent with Pekrun’s (2006) control-value theory of emotion.
Conceptual & Attitude Change
Because the goal of science education is to increase scientific literacy, this often requires
prior conceptions to be replaced. The correction of prior misconceptions to more closely align
with scientific information is known as conceptual change (Vosniadou, 2013). In their theory of
conceptual change, Posner et al. (1982) posit that prior concepts are only replaced when there is
sufficient pressure to change and when the conditions of the conceptual ecology are ready. This
process includes correcting misconceptions, as well as a shift towards more constructivist
epistemic beliefs, which in turn affect emotion and learning (Muis et al., 2015). Conceptual
change has the potential to influence a person’s attitude towards the subject at hand. When the
evaluation shifts in valence towards or away from the positive or negative direction, this is
referred to as attitude change (Maio & Haddock, 2010). A commonly used instrument for
conceptual change is a refutation text, which directly addresses common misconceptions
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(Broughton et al., 2013; Heddy et al., 2017; Muis, Sinatra et al., 2018; Muis et al., 2020; Thacker
et al., 2020; Trevors et al., 2021; Trevors et al., 2016). Expository texts provide a broad
description, more similar to a textbook reading, and do not evoke as much epistemic judgment as
refutation texts (Lombardi, Danielson, et al., 2016). Persuasive texts present the benefits and
drawbacks of a particular topic, typically with the goal of persuading the reader. These have also
been shown to prompt attitude change (Sinatra et al., 2012).
Conceptual Change
Strong, negative attitudes towards controversial topics like GMFs are often attributed to a
knowledge deficit on the topic. This deficit model posits that public resistance could be
countered by simply providing relevant information (Simis et al., 2016). Put another way,
increasing knowledge should drive conceptual change, resulting in attitude change. Some
findings seem to support this model, such as a national survey of U.S. adults that showed the
strongest negative attitudes towards GM food correlate with weak knowledge but strong
confidence (Fernbach et al., 2019). European studies have also shown that general science
knowledge is a strong predictor of positive attitudes towards GM food (Rutjens et al., 2018). An
international meta-analysis also found a small, but significant correlation between general
knowledge and attitudes towards science. However, while general knowledge was not predictive
of positive attitudes towards GMFs in particular, knowledge of biology and biotechnology was
(Allum et al., 2008; McPhetres et al., 2019). Such findings are reminiscent of the DunningKruger effect, wherein an individual’s confidence is disproportional to their actual understanding
of a topic. According to this effect, people often overestimate their own understanding of
unfamiliar topics and lack the cognitive ability to acknowledge the limits of their knowledge,
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leading to erroneous conclusions. Theoretically, as knowledge increases, so should the
understanding of the complexity of the issue (Kruger & Dunning, 1999).
Certain findings are consistent with the deficit model, including a study in which
undergraduate students showed improved understanding of, and more positive attitudes towards,
GMFs. In this study, the non-science major undergraduate students volunteered for a peerteaching program in which they were tasked with teaching high school students about GM
technology and food. By the end of the study, 97% of the participants held a favorable view of
GMFs, up from less than half at the beginning of the study. Additionally, the 43% of participants
that initially viewed GMFs as harmful disappeared to none by the end of the study. Surveys
indicated that most of the participants attributed their knowledge gain to the peer-teaching.
Furthermore, the most significant factor in their attitude change was the comparison of genetic
modification with selective breeding, the process by which humans have intentionally and
drastically altered wild organisms since the dawn of agriculture (Chrispeels et al., 2019). In the
aforementioned surveys of GMF safety, the trend of rapidly increasing skepticism grew
primarily among those with lower levels of science knowledge; those with higher degrees did not
become significantly more opposed (Kennedy et al., 2018). Similarly, some international studies
indicate that a lack of understanding in GM technology is predictive of skepticism. In particular,
one longitudinal study found that an extended unit on GM technology resulted in increased
positive attitudes and a decreased assessment of GMFs as risky (McPhetres et al., 2019). Such
findings seem to support the deficit model.
However, the deficit model does not account for all the factors that can influence attitude
change, such as demographics, worldview implications, political factors, self-concept, prior
background knowledge, epistemic beliefs, and emotions. For this reason, attempts to test this
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model have yielded inconsistent results. For example, Kahan et al. (2012) used a nationally
representative sample of U.S. adults to compare degree of science literacy and concern about
climate change. While the deficit model would predict a direct relationship, the opposite was
found. Those with the highest degree of literacy and technical reasoning actually showed the
greatest degree of cultural polarization on the issue. Specifically, they were motivated by the
personal interests of those they were most closely associated with (Kahan et al., 2012). On the
other hand, other studies find conflicting results. That same year, Sinatra et al. (2012) assessed
college students’ attitude about climate change before and after reading a persuasive text, which
used provocative language to assert pros and cons, but did not attempt to refute common
misconceptions. The results indicated that students became more concerned about climate
change and were more willing to act in mitigating its effects over the course of the study (Sinatra
et al., 2012).
Similarly, Potter et al. (2017) examined college students’ use of evidence to answer
questions about GMFs. The results showed that students rarely cited biological evidence in their
responses, despite the biology majors having shown competence with the necessary concepts.
The results also indicated that the correct use of such data was closely correlated with accurate
scientific conceptions and strong reasoning about the topic, as measured by the views of faculty
and experts on the topic. Therefore, while many students had the necessary tools to support their
conceptual understandings scientifically, they instead relied on informal reasoning such as
essentialist rationales. As such, many were unwilling or unable to use their tools to correct their
own misconceptions (Potter et al., 2017). These results are consistent with Posner et al.'s (1982)
evaluation that the conceptual change requires dissatisfaction with a prior explanation, which
was not broadly established in Potter et al.’s (2017) investigation.
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Such findings suggest that the deficit model is limited in its explanatory power. Critics
claim the model is too rigid, unable to account for the complex interplay of factors involved in
conceptual and attitude change (Simis et al., 2016). However, it is still applied in science
education and communication, often attempting to influence public perceptions and policy. The
deficit model may persist because most scientists lack any significant public communication
training. Another potential reason for its tenacity is that scientists are trained to set aside external
influences as much as possible and draw conclusions from the data. While this is good scientific
practice, it is not safe to assume that the general public is similarly motivated (Simis et al.,
2016). For these reasons, it is crucial that scientific information be presented in an accessible and
understandable way, with considerations made for the other factors influencing conceptual and
attitude change (McPhetres et al., 2019).
Because SSIs tend to reflect situations where there is no obvious solution, students must
utilize discernment to balance multiple concerns. In many ways, this mirrors the nature of
scientific discovery as a nuanced and iterative process. Therefore, nuanced views tend to reflect
the multifaceted nature of the problem at hand, whereas oversimplified views tend to be
indicative of limited understanding. While this has not been explored extensively in the research
literature, Dinsmore et al. (2017) studied view complexity regarding GMFs through an
intervention of different types of texts: persuasive, informative, and narrative. College students
were asked open-ended questions before and after the intervention, and their responses were
categorized by complexity based on respondents’ use of evidence. While the results did not pass
the threshold for statistical significance, informative and narrative text correlated with modest
increase in complexity. There were also unexpected results. For example, persuasive text showed
a decrease in complexity. This unexpected result may have been due to participant fatigue
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(Dinsmore et al., 2017). However, another possibility is the backfire effect, a phenomenon that
occurs when attempts to correct a misconception instead cause deepened commitment to it
(Nyhan & Reifler, 2010).
First described in political sociology, the backfire effect is more common in controversial
topics that are tied deeply to one’s identity (Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). People have also been
shown to be more likely to uncritically accept arguments favorable for their own position, while
being more skeptical of arguments unfavorable to it. Therefore, what begins as confirmation bias
can result in belief polarization, which occurs when the same information presented to both sides
in a conflict results in further divergence between the two sides. While the backfire effect is
often observed in political communication, it has also been documented in peoples’ response to
controversial SSIs, including vaccinations, climate change, and GMFs. This effect should be
considered when attempting to correct misconceptions for such topics (Lewandowsky et al.,
2012).
Another important factor in conceptual change is the role of epistemic judgments.
Lombardi, Nussbaum, et al. (2016) built on Posner et al.’s (1982) conceptual change model by
describing the role of plausibility judgments in conceptual change. According to this model,
people pre-process the validity of new information based on their background knowledge, the
complexity and perceived certainty of the claims, and the perceived credibility of the source.
These implicit judgments can cause misconceptions to persist due to their perceived plausibility
(Lombardi, Nussbaum, et al., 2016). Epistemic judgments have also been experimentally shown
to facilitate conceptual change. By using a refutation text to address misconceptions about
climate change, Lombardi, Danielson, et al. (2016) found that such texts resulted in greater
epistemic judgment and conceptual change than expository texts. Participants that more critically
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evaluated the plausibility of the claims presented to them demonstrated greater knowledge
acquisition (Lombardi, Danielson, et al., 2016). These judgments are critical in issues with a
significant plausibility gap, such as with GMFs. Furthermore, going forward into what some
have called the “post-truth” era, misinformation is being increasingly weaponized for a variety of
purposes. As such, it is imperative that science education consider such plausibility judgments
when attempting to correct misinformation (Sinatra & Lombardi, 2020).
Trevors et al. (2016) sought to explore the cause of the backfire effect in response to
GMFs by correcting some common misconceptions. Participants answered questions about
dietary self-concept before reading either an expository or a refutation text about GMFs. Then,
they reported emotions, attitudes, and answered a knowledge assessment. The results suggested
that refutation text, combined with factors of self-concept, resulted in negative emotions. These
emotions negatively impacted knowledge acquisition and attitude through the study. The authors
propose that this can occur when the refutation of prior conceptions causes the participant to see
their self-concept as threatened, leading to a defensive response of either ignoring the
information or relying on prior knowledge that confirms prior attitudes (Trevors et al., 2016).
The backfire effect is an example of both the risks of refutation texts and the shortcomings of the
deficit model. Conceptual change is also influenced by epistemic and emotional factors and is
closely associated with attitude change.
Emotions & Attitude Change
The cognitive and emotional factors that influence students’ views of SSIs have largely
been investigated separately in education research, following from the theory of conceptual
change (Posner et al., 1982) and the control-value theory of emotion (Pekrun, 2006). However,
some have described the interplay of these factors, particularly as they relate to controversial
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topics. Several studies have explored the interplay of epistemic beliefs and emotions during
conceptual and attitude change.
Conceptual change has been shown to result in emotional changes. Heddy and Sinatra
(2013) described one such emotional effect following students’ conceptual change surrounding
evolution. In this study, Heddy and Sinatra sought to use an educational model to help students
grasp the real-life relevance of evolution, a topic that has long been known to cause anxiety in
learners. They found that by correcting misconceptions, students experienced an emotional
change. Specifically, they reported higher levels of enjoyment and lower levels of anxiety
(Heddy & Sinatra, 2013). This is likely due to the emotional response to resolving cognitive
dissonance (Posner et al., 1982). According to D’Mello and Graesser (2012), discrepancies
between prior conceptual understanding and new information lead to disequilibrium and
confusion. In fact, confusion is one of the most frequently encountered epistemic emotions
during learning (Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018). D’Mello et al. (2014) argue that this confusion is
an important factor for complex learning. When this confusion is resolved through conceptual
change, it results in positive epistemic emotions. However, continued confusion results in
negative epistemic emotions, such as frustration (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012).
Studies have also shown that emotional factors can also influence conceptual change.
Building on Posner et al.’s (1982) theory of conceptual change, Dole and Sinatra (1998) posited
that conceptual change is most likely to occur with deep engagement, which is driven by
motivation and emotions. In a fascinating study, Trevors et al. (2021) explored the effects of
induced emotions on participants’ willingness to revise misconceptions about vaccines. The
researchers induced either positive or negative emotions, participants watched clips from either
the improvisational comedy show Whose Line Is it Anyway? or the death scene from The Lion
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King. Paradoxically, participants with negative emotions were more likely to revise their
conception of vaccines than those with positive emotions. Negative prior emotions are thought to
facilitate accommodation because they are more congruent with the revision of knowledge
(Trevors et al., 2021). While the study assessed prior emotions rather than epistemic emotions,
the results are still relevant for science education. Along these lines, Muis, Sinatra, et al. (2018)
tested the effects of refutation text on epistemic emotions during conceptual change, particularly
of value students placed on a topic. They found that when students placed high value on the
topic, the refutation text yielded greater surprise, but found the opposite relationship with
expository text. They also found that refutation texts predicted greater critical thinking and
elaboration strategies, as well as helping foster conceptual change when compared to expository
text. The positive emotions of surprise and curiosity sparked by reading the refutation text
resulted in greater critical thinking, elaboration, and correction of misconceptions (Muis, Sinatra
et al., 2018).
While the interplay between conceptual and emotional factors have been explored in
science education, fewer studies have also incorporated attitude change. Sinatra and Seyranian
(2016) factored the role of emotions into their attitude/conceptual change framework. This twoby-two model considers an individual’s advocacy for a particular topic (pro vs. con) as well as
the accuracy of their conceptions regarding the topic (justified vs. unjustified). Four profiles
emerge, which are pro-justified, pro-unjustified, con-justified, and con-unjustified. According to
this framework, correcting misconceptions can result in a shift from unjustified to justified
conceptions. This correction can also inform an attitudinal shift from opposition to support,
which is mediated by epistemic emotions. Therefore, it seems that conceptual change informs
emotional change, which in turn dictates attitudinal change.
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This pattern is supported by several empirical findings (Muis et al., 2020; Thacker et al.,
2020). For example, Broughton et al. (2013) assessed the role of emotions in mediating the
reactions of fifth and sixth graders to the reclassification of Pluto from planetary status to a dwarf
planet. The researchers used a refutation text to correct common misconceptions, which resulted
in a marked increase in positive emotions and attitude change. Therefore, positive emotions were
shown to result in more positive attitudes (Broughton et al., 2013). In another study, Heddy et al.
(2017) demonstrated a similar relationship in college students’ views of GMFs. In this study, a
refutation text was also used, which corrected misconceptions and generally resulted in improved
emotions and attitudes about the topic compared to the control group. Thus, emotions are
understood to act as mediators between conceptual change and attitudes, a relationship which
was earlier theorized by Petty and Briñol (2015). They posited that this mediating effect was
influenced by the extent of student elaboration on, or engagement with, the topic. If elaboration
is low, attitudes are simply modified towards the valence of the emotion, either positive or
negative. On the other hand, if elaboration is high, emotions can act as arguments within the
thought process. If elaboration were unconfined, emotions would influence the extent of student
engagement with the topic. Moreover, Petty and Briñol (2015) proposed a timing factor, whereby
encountering an emotion before deep thought would bias the thinker in that direction. On the
other hand, emotions encountered after deep thought cause the thinker to reflect and question
their confidence about the conclusions they had drawn.
These studies are necessary steps towards grasping the interplay of conceptual
understanding, emotions, and attitudes (Broughton et al., 2013; Heddy et al., 2017). However,
their linear nature does not fully address the nuanced relationship that exists among such factors.
Op ’t Eynde and Turner (2006) posited a more dynamic understanding of cognitive and
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attitudinal factors, which allows for feedback within the system. This model also allows for a
more nuanced view of the role of individual differences and social factors in conceptual and
attitudinal change. This is consistent with the findings that dietary self-concept predicts negative
emotional response to GMFs (Trevors et al., 2016). An individual’s self-concept is comprised of
deeply held beliefs, including epistemic beliefs. Social identity is another factor of one’s selfconcept, and has been shown to predict attitudes towards controversial scientific findings (Kahan
et al., 2012; Nauroth et al., 2015). In an effort to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of
these factors, Nadelson et al. (2018) built on Sinatra and Seyranian’s (2016) framework in
developing their Dynamic Model of Conceptual Change (DMCC). According to the DMCC,
conceptual change occurs in stages, including the subject’s interaction with the external message,
consideration, and engagement with it through dynamic contemplation. If the message is
received and processed, conceptual change can occur. However, there are varying degrees of
potential change, from deep transformation to dormant consideration. Each step in this process is
influenced by epistemic factors and emotional reactions, which affect long-term acceptance and
attitude towards the topic (Nadelson et al., 2018).
The interplay between epistemic beliefs and emotions with conceptual and attitude
change are particularly apparent in the study of views of GMFs. In a longitudinal study,
McPhetres et al. (2019) demonstrated a link between conceptual change and improved attitudes
towards GMFs. Following a five-week unit on GM technology, participants reported more
positive attitudes towards GMFs. This is consistent with the findings of Chrispeels et al. (2019).
Heddy et al.’s (2017) study supported this relationship, and further demonstrated the mediating
role of epistemic emotions in these attitudes using a refutation text. This text was then used in a
large international study, which sought to explore the impact of refutation and persuasive texts
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on attitudes towards GMFs. In this study, undergraduate students were assessed for prior
attitudes before reading the refutation text and persuasive texts highlighting either the advantages
of GMFs, the disadvantages of GMFs, or both. Then, they were assessed for epistemic emotions
and topical knowledge. Participants presented with the advantages showed more knowledge
gains and a more positive attitude towards GMFs. Further analysis indicated that positive attitude
change was mediated by positive emotions, including joy, hope, enjoyment, and curiosity. On the
other hand, frustration drove more negative attitudes (Thacker et al., 2020).
Thacker et al.’s (2020) study indicated that positive messages about GMFs were more
effective than negative messages at driving conceptual and attitude change. However, it did not
establish the mechanism behind these changes. To explain this process, Muis et al. (2020)
proposed that epistemic judgments and emotions were at play. In this study, undergraduate
students were presented with one of four combinations of either a refutation or expository text
paired with a persuasive text, presenting either positive or negative arguments about GMFs. The
texts were based on those used previously by Heddy et al. (2017) and Thacker et al. (2020).
Participants that read a refutation text paired with a positive persuasive text demonstrated
increased epistemic judgment and conceptual change, reappraising more misconceptions about
GMFs. The results also confirmed prior findings that positive and negative emotions predicted
change towards more positively and negatively valenced attitudes respectively (Muis et al.,
2020). Muis et al. (2021) further established that epistemic beliefs further impacted epistemic
emotions and learning about GMFs. After being assessed for prior knowledge and epistemic
beliefs, undergraduate students were presented with the aforementioned refutation text along
with the pros and cons of GMFs. They were then assessed for epistemic emotions before writing
an argumentative essay. The results indicated that beliefs about the complexity, source,
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justification, and certainty of knowledge variably affected epistemic emotions and critical
thinking (Muis et al., 2021).
Summary
The purpose of this review was to evaluate the literature concerning the impact of
students’ preexisting beliefs on their views of socio-scientific issues. Because the goal of science
education is to promote conceptual reasoning and the application of knowledge, it often requires
conceptual change on the part of the student. The process of learning elicits emotional responses
that can further influence attitudes related to learning. Much research has examined the role of
conceptual reasoning in scientific literacy, which has been fostered through a variety of
interventions. However, other studies have shown that the complexity of students’ views
regarding such issues is also prone to influence from personal or epistemic factors. Such
informal reasoning includes epistemic beliefs and commitments as well as the use of construalbased reasoning, such as teleological, essentialist, or anthropocentric patterns. These construals
are particularly influential when students evaluate SSIs. Other research has examined the role of
emotions in mediating the impact of epistemic beliefs on learning outcomes, as well as
attitudinal changes surrounding topics.
However, the strongest studies are those that seek a holistic understanding of these
factors, rather than exploring them in isolation. People are complex, and make decisions based
partly on beliefs and emotions, not simply on conceptual understanding. The literature indicates
that more constructivist beliefs about the nature of knowledge can yield more positive and
activating emotions, resulting in positive attitudes towards scientific topics. While training future
scientists is a goal of science education, the main purpose should be training scientifically literate
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citizens. As scientific issues gain increasing public scrutiny, it is more important than ever that
average adults be equipped to engage with these topics holistically.
The relationship between epistemic beliefs, emotions, and attitudes towards SSIs is
dynamic and ripe for future exploration (Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016). While some research has
investigated these factors, the interaction between each factor has not been studied. The purpose
of the present study is to address the research gap with an emphasis on GMFs. By considering
the impact of epistemic beliefs and emotions on attitudes towards GMFs, this study has
significant implications for both educational research and practice.
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CHAPTER THREE: METHODS
Overview
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between epistemic beliefs,
epistemic emotions, and attitudes towards GMFs among undergraduate students. This chapter
begins with an explanation of and rationale for the non-experimental correlation design that were
used to carry out this study. Next, the research questions are stated, along with their
corresponding null hypotheses. Then, the setting and participants are described, including
demographic data. The following section describes the instruments that were used to measure the
predictor and criterion variables in depth, and reports reliability considerations. Detailed study
procedures are then described for the collection and analysis of data.
Design
The purpose of this quantitative, predictive correlational study is to investigate the
relationships between epistemic beliefs, epistemic emotions, and attitudes towards GMFs.
Because the function of a quantitative correlational research design is to examine relationships
between variables, this study utilized a quantitative, non-experimental, correlation design.
Moreover, correlational research allows for evaluating associations between several variables,
making it ideal for this study. However, the causality of these associations cannot be
conclusively demonstrated in a correlational design because of the possibility of additional
confounding factors. To test the causality, an experimental setup should be used, wherein
participants are randomly assigned to treatment and control groups in an effort to account for
potential confounding factors (Gall et al., 2007).
Correlational designs have an established history of use in educational research related to
SSIs (Muis et al., 2015; Potter et al., 2017; Richard et al., 2017). Studies of the factors
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influencing GMF attitudes in particular have also relied heavily on correlational designs (Heddy
et al., 2017; McPhetres et al., 2019; Muis et al., 2020; Thacker et al., 2020). Some studies have
utilized control groups and longitudinal designs to establish a causal relationship between
variables (Chrispeels et al., 2019; McPhetres et al., 2019). However, this is beyond the scope of
the present study.
In this study, one of the predictor variables is epistemic beliefs. Epistemic beliefs are
those concerned with the nature of knowledge and its acquisition (Schraw et al., 2002). This
variable was measured using Schraw et al.’s (2002) Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI).
One of the criterion variables in this study is attitudes towards GMFs. Attitudes are
general appraisals or judgments of a subject, GMFs in this case (Heddy et al., 2017). This
variable was measured using Heddy et al.’s (2017) Attitudes about GMFs survey.
Epistemic emotions are those related to the generation of knowledge and of learning
(Pekrun et al., 2017). In this study, epistemic emotions served as a predictor variable for
Research Question 3, but as a criterion variable for Research Question 1. Epistemic emotions
were measured using the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales (EES) (Pekrun et al., 2017).
Research Questions
RQ1: Do epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students predict epistemic emotions
following refutation of common misconceptions about GMFs?
RQ2: Do epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students predict attitudes towards GMFs
following refutation of common misconceptions?
RQ3: Do epistemic emotions of undergraduate students predict attitudes towards GMFs
following refutation of common misconceptions?
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Hypotheses
The null hypotheses for this study are:
H01: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, positive epistemic emotions, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales following refutation of common misconceptions about
GMFs.
H02: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, negative epistemic emotions, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales following refutation of common misconceptions about
GMFs.
H03: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as measured by the Attitudes
about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions about GMFs.
H04: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, positive epistemic emotions of undergraduate students, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as
measured by the Attitudes about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions
about GMFs.
H05: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, negative epistemic emotions of undergraduate students, as measured by the
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Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as
measured by the Attitudes about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions
about GMFs.
Participants and Setting
The target population for this study was undergraduate students in the United States,
particularly those taking introductory science courses. The sample was drawn from
undergraduate students at a Christian university located in central Virginia accredited by the
Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS). Participants for this study must meet the
requirements of being in non-biological majors, having never taken an introductory biology
course, and being currently enrolled in an introductory science course. Eligible participants were
drawn from a convenience sample of students in eight courses during the fall semester of 2021:
Principles of Biology, General Biology I, Principles of Human Biology, Elements of General
Chemistry, General Chemistry I, Advanced General Chemistry I, Essentials of General and
Organic Chemistry, and General Physics I. An email was sent to all students in these courses that
met the study requirements, explaining the nature of the study and inviting students to be
participants.
From this population, N = 78 participants were drawn. This sample size exceeded the
minimum required when assuming a medium effect size in a correlational study at the .05 alpha
level, which is N = 66 (Gall et al., 2007). Of the survey respondents, 39 (50%) were male
students, 38 (49%) were female students, and 1 (1%) selected “other”. Participants were drawn
from each grade level, including freshmen 37 (47%), sophomores 30 (38%), juniors 10 (13%),
and seniors 1 (1%). Age demographics showed that all 78 (100%) of the participants were
between 18 and 23 years of age. Ethnicity data showed that 5 (6%) were Hispanic, 3 (4%) were
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Asian, 5 (6%) were black/African American, 1 (1%) was Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander, and
68 (87%) were white/European American. Religious demographics showed that 75 (96%)
participants were of Christian affiliation, 1 (1%) of Muslim affiliation, and 2 (3%) identified as
“other”.
Instrumentation
Epistemic Belief Inventory
The Epistemic Belief Inventory (EBI) is an instrument that was developed by Schraw et
al. (2002) to assess five factors of epistemic beliefs: omniscient authority, certain knowledge,
quick learning, simple knowledge, and innate ability. This instrument is a modification of the
Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire (EBQ), developed by Schommer (1990), wherein content
validity was established through screenings with educational psychology experts. The EBQ has
also given rise to other instruments, such as the Discipline-Focused Epistemological Beliefs
Questionnaire (DFEBQ) (Hofer, 2000; Muis et al., 2016). Like the EBQ, the EBI was designed
for use with undergraduate college students, making it appropriate for this study. However,
Schraw et al. (2002) built on the EBQ by clarifying the omniscient authority factor, shortening
the instrument from 32 questions to 28 and improving efficiency. The resulting factors were also
more homogenous, resulting in greater criterion validity. The EBI was chosen for this study
based on these improvements. The EBI has also been used in several other studies (Frederick et
al., 2012; Ismail, 2016; Neely, 2016).
The instrument consists of five dimensions based around the five factors of epistemic
beliefs: Omniscient Authority, Certain Knowledge, Quick Learning, Simple Knowledge, and
Innate Ability. Each question is on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to
5 (strongly agree). The Omniscient Authority dimension includes five questions and a sub-scale
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reliability of Cronbach’s alpha .65. The Certain Knowledge dimension includes six questions and
a subscale reliability of Cronbach’s alpha .63. The Quick Learning dimension includes five
questions and a sub-scale reliability of Cronbach’s alpha .60. The Simple Knowledge dimension
includes six questions and a sub-scale reliability of Cronbach’s alpha .66. The Innate Ability
dimension includes six questions and a sub-scale reliability of Cronbach’s alpha .63. Reliability
for the EBI was established in a study of 160 undergraduate students. There is a total of 28
questions, with a total score that ranges from 28 to 140. The higher the score, the more naïve the
participant’s beliefs about that particular dimension of knowledge, or knowledge as a whole
(Schraw et al., 2002).
Self-report measures for epistemic beliefs have suffered from persistent shortcomings,
drawing heavy criticism in the literature (DeBacker et al., 2008; Muis et al., 2016). In particular,
subscale reliability scores for both the EBQ and the EBI are commonly found to be questionable
or poor. Some studies using the EBQ, generally performed in western countries like the United
States and the Netherlands, have had questionable to poor subscale reliability scores (Otting et
al., 2010; Schommer, 1993). Others have yielded acceptable Cronbach’s alpha scores, such as
those performed in Fiji and Turkey (Mehdinezhad & Bamari, 2015; Phan, 2008). The EBI also
suffers from mixed subscale reliabilities, even within the United States. Moreover, some studies
have reported a combination of acceptable and questionable Cronbach’s alpha values (Bendixen
et al., 1998; Neely, 2016). DeBacker et al. (2008) found consistently questionable reliability
scores, and also noted that their study with larger sample sizes yielded smaller Cronbach’s alpha
scores than those found in the literature. However, some studies have yielded promising
reliability values in the acceptable range in both Singapore and the United States (Frederick et
al., 2012; Lim & Chapman, 2020). Despite irregular subscale reliabilities, the EBI was chosen
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for this study due to its validity and appropriateness for addressing the research questions.
Furthermore, because the research questions do not evaluate subscales. For the current study, the
EBI demonstrated a cumulative Cronbach’s alpha of .73.
This instrument takes approximately 20 minutes to complete (Schraw et al., 2002). As
part of this study, the instrument was administered via Qualtrics survey platform. Dr. Bendixen
granted permission to use the EBI via email (Appendix C).
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales
The Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales (EES) is an instrument developed by Pekrun
et al. (2017). The EES was designed to measure multiple epistemic emotions during learning and
problem-solving and is built on a seven-factor model evaluates surprise, curiosity, enjoyment,
confusion, anxiety, frustration, and boredom. This instrument was originally developed by
Pekrun and Meier (2011) as the Epistemic Emotion Scales. However, it was revised and tested
for validity using data from a multinational study, and was used in the development of the
cognitive incongruity model (Muis et al., 2015). The EES was also used by Rosman and Mayer
(2018).
Each question in the EES asks the participant how strongly they feel a particular emotion
using a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 5 (very strong). This instrument
includes two versions. The long version includes a total of 21 questions, three for each emotion
measured. The questions utilize synonyms based around frequently used emotion words. The
short version includes only seven questions, one for each emotion measured using only the
primary terms. For example, the long version asks has participants rate their intensity of their
boredom, dullness, and monotony. The short version has them only rate the intensity of their
boredom (Pekrun et al., 2017). Validity and reliability for the EES were established in a
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multinational study with N = 438 university students. Internal validity was tested using
correlational analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. Positive emotions were shown to
correlate positively with one another, as were negative emotions. Positive and negative emotions
correlated negatively with one another. These results suggest convergent validity. Reliabilities
for all subscales were measured by Cronbach’s alpha as follows: surprise (α = .84), curiosity (α =
.88), enjoyment (α = .78), confusion (α = .78), anxiety (α = .76), frustration (α = .77), and
boredom (α = .86). The long and short versions of the EES were determined to be sufficiently
similar, with averaged correlation values ranging from r = .65 to r = .83 (Pekrun et al., 2017).
The long version of the EES takes approximately 20 minutes to complete, while the short
version takes approximately 5 minutes. Due to the shorter time investment and its more focused
nature, the short version was utilized for this study. Furthermore, the results were grouped so as
to give each participant a score on positive emotions and negative emotions. Positive emotions
include surprise, curiosity, and enjoyment. Possible scores range from 3 to 15. Negative
emotions included confusion, anxiety, frustration, and boredom. Possible scores for negative
emotions range from 4 to 20. This instrument was administered as part of this study via Qualtrics
survey platform. Dr. Pekrun granted permission to use the EES via email (Appendix C).
Attitudes about GMFs Survey
The Attitudes about GMFs Survey is an instrument developed by Heddy et al. (2017) to
measure attitudes towards GMFs. This instrument was modified from Poortinga and Pidgeon's
(2006) study of attitudes towards genetically modified food. This survey measures four different
attitude aspects for valence, or direction, regarding GMFs: general attitude, acceptability,
behavioral intentions, and concern (Heddy et al., 2017).
This short instrument uses four questions, one to assess each of the four attitude aspects.
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Each question uses a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree). As such, the total scores range from 1 to 20, with higher scores indicating more positive
attitudes towards GMFs overall. The reliability of this measure was established with Cronbach’s
alpha values of .84 (Heddy et al., 2017), 0.91 (Thacker et al., 2020), and 0.93 (Muis et al., 2020).
For the current study, the instrument demonstrated a cumulative Cronbach’s alpha of .86.
The Attitude about GMFs Survey takes approximately 5 minutes to complete. This
instrument was administered as part of this study via Qualtrics survey platform. Dr. Heddy
granted permission to use this instrument via email (Appendix C).
Procedures
First, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the university was contacted to obtain
permission to conduct the study. See Appendix A for the IRB approval letter. Then, the office of
Analytics and Decision Support sent out the recruitment email to eligible participants enrolled in
introductory science courses. The email introduced the study and its relevance and requested
participation from them. Students were also made aware that, as an added incentive, participants
were entered into a drawing to win one of three $50 Amazon gift cards. Finally, the email
included a link to Qualtrics, a versatile online survey platform that is officially authorized by the
university. The Qualtrics survey began with a consent form, in accordance with the IRB approval
process.
Data was collected through Qualtrics in five steps, which must be completed in order.
First, participants filled out the demographic questionnaire, which includes questions about
gender, age, class, grade level, major, ethnicity, and religious affiliation. This step takes
approximately two minutes to complete. Next, participants completed the Epistemic Belief
Inventory (EBI) (Schraw et al., 2002). This instrument contains 28 questions and takes

63
approximately 20 minutes to complete. Next, participants read a refutation text which concisely
addresses several common misconceptions about GMFs, followed by a persuasive text
highlighting the advantages of GMFs (Thacker et al., 2020). These texts take approximately 10
minutes to read (see Appendix B). After reading these texts, participants completed the short
version of the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales (EES) (Pekrun et al., 2017). This
instrument includes seven questions and takes approximately 5 minutes to complete. Finally,
participants completed the Attitudes about GMFs Survey (Heddy et al., 2017). This instrument
includes four questions and takes approximately 3 minutes to complete. The entire procedure
takes approximately 40 minutes to complete.
After the data were collected, they were downloaded from Qualtrics and organized into
an Excel spreadsheet. Three participants were randomly selected to win the $50 Amazon gift
cards, which were distributed via email. The data were stored in an Excel spreadsheet on a
password-protected laptop, which is backed up to Microsoft OneDrive. Data were then analyzed
using SPSS statistical software.
Data Analysis
Each of the five null hypotheses was tested using bivariate regression. This technique was
used for this study because it measures the magnitude of the relationship between predictor and
criterion variables, which allows the researcher to evaluate the predictive relationships of the null
hypotheses. Bivariate regression is based on the assumption that the relationship between the
variables is linear (Gall et al., 2007). However, before this relationship can be addressed,
descriptive statistics of each variable were calculated. Then, the data set were screened for
missing data and inspected for inconsistencies.
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In order for bivariate linear regression to be considered an appropriate statistical
methodology for determining the relationships outlined in the hypotheses, three assumptions
must be met. First, the assumption of bivariate outliers must be met. This was determined by
examining the scatter plots of each pair of predictor and criterion variables in question. If no
extreme outliers are found, the assumption of bivariate outliers is considered tenable. Second, the
assumption of linearity must be satisfied. This is determined by adding a line of fit to each scatter
plot. If the data broadly follow the linear distribution corresponding with the line of fit, the
assumption of linearity is considered tenable. Next, the assumption of bivariate normal
distribution must be met. This is measured by inspecting the distribution and looking for the
characteristic “cigar shape” around the line of fit. If this distribution is observed, the assumption
of bivariate normal distribution is considered tenable (Warner, 2013).
Bivariate linear regression tests were then carried out for each of the hypotheses. For
each hypothesis, R was calculated, which serves as the effect size statistic. Bivariate linear
regression works on looking for a signal-to-noise ratio, which allows the researcher to determine
how much of the criterion variables can be predicted by the predictor variable. R2 is the metric
used to determine this ratio. Furthermore, directionality of the relationship can be determined by
the positive or negative value of R. A positive value for R indicates a positive correlation
between the variables in question. In a bivariate linear regression, null hypothesis testing is
accomplished using an F ratio (Warner, 2013). This value also serves to test the significance. In
this study, the alpha level for each hypothesis test was set at .02 (p = .02). Because five
regressions are being run on the same data, a Bonferroni correction was used to reduce the risk of
a Type I error (Warner, 2013). Using this procedure, each of the five hypotheses was tested.
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CHAPTER FOUR: FINDINGS
Overview
This chapter summarizes the results of data and its analysis. First, the research questions
and hypotheses are restated. Then, the descriptive statistics for each research instrument are
presented, including the mean and standard deviation for the scores assigned to these responses.
Next, the assumption tests are described and found to be tenable. Each of the five null
hypotheses was tested using linear bivariate regression, and the results are presented and
evaluated for each null hypothesis below.
Research Questions
RQ1: Do epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students predict epistemic emotions
following refutation of common misconceptions about GMFs?
RQ2: Do epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students predict attitudes towards GMFs
following refutation of common misconceptions?
RQ3: Do epistemic emotions of undergraduate students predict attitudes towards GMFs
following refutation of common misconceptions?
Hypotheses
The null hypotheses for this study are:
H01: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, positive epistemic emotions, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales following refutation of common misconceptions about
GMFs.
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H02: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, negative epistemic emotions, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales following refutation of common misconceptions about
GMFs.
H03: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as measured by the Attitudes
about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions about GMFs.
H04: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, positive epistemic emotions of undergraduate students, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as
measured by the Attitudes about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions
about GMFs.
H05: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, negative epistemic emotions of undergraduate students, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as
measured by the Attitudes about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions
about GMFs.
Descriptive Statistics
Data for this study were collected using a series of survey instruments. Epistemic beliefs
were evaluated using Schraw et al.'s (2002) Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI). Epistemic
emotions were assessed using Pekrun et al.'s (2017) Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales
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(EES), which was divided into separate assessments for positive and negative emotions. Finally,
participants’ attitudes towards GMFs were evaluated using Heddy et al.'s (2017) Attitudes
towards GMFs survey. The survey response percentages for each survey are included in
Appendix D. Each instrument yields a score for each participant based on the sum of their scored
responses, as described in the preceding Instrumentation section. Descriptive statistics for these
scores are included in Table 1.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics for Instrument Scores
Instrument

Minimum

Maximum

M

SD

N

EBI

55

104

79.69

9.345

78

EES (Positive)

4

13

8.49

1.688

78

EES (Negative)

4

18

9.76

3.212

78

Attitudes about GMFs

4

20

12.88

3.117

78

Results
Assumption Tests
Each of the five hypothesis was tested using bivariate linear regression, which requires
that three assumptions first be met. First, the assumption of bivariate outliers was tested by
examining the scatter plot for each pair of predictor and criterion variables. No extreme outliers
were found, so the assumption of bivariate outliers was found to be tenable. Second, a line of fit
was added to each scatter plot to test assumption of linearity. Since the data broadly followed the
linear distribution, the assumption of linearity was considered tenable. Finally, the scatter plots
were examined to test the assumption of bivariate normal distribution. The characteristic “cigar
shape” around the line of fit was found, indicating this assumption was considered tenable.
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Hypotheses
The first null hypothesis is as follows:
H01: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, positive epistemic emotions, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales following refutation of common misconceptions about
GMFs. Results did not indicate a significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable (EBI Score) and the criterion variable (EES Positive Score). Thus, the null hypothesis
was not rejected at a 98% confidence interval: F(1, 76) = .178, p = .674. See Figure 1 for the
scatter plot, Table 2 for the results of the ANOVA, and Table 3 for the results of the model
analysis.
Figure 1
Scatter Plot of Criterion and Predictor Variables for H01
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Table 2
ANOVA Results for H01
Source
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
.512
218.975
219.487

df
1
76
77

Mean Square
.512
2.881

F
.178

Sig.
.674

Table 3
Model Summary for H01
R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

.048

.002

-.011

1.697

The second null hypothesis is as follows:
H02: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, negative epistemic emotions, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales following refutation of common misconceptions about
GMFs. Results did not indicate a significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable (EBI Score) and the criterion variable (EES Negative Score). Thus, the null hypothesis
was not rejected at a 98% confidence interval: F(1, 76) = 5.167, p = .026. See Figure 2 for the
scatter plot, Table 4 for the results of the ANOVA, and Table 5 for the results of the model
analysis.
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Figure 2
Scatter Plot of Criterion and Predictor Variables for H02

Table 4
ANOVA Results for H02
Source
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
50.571
743.801
794.372

df
1
76
77

Mean Square
50.571
9.787

F
5.167

Table 5
Model Summary for H02
R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

.252

.064

.051

3.128

Sig.
.026
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The third null hypothesis is as follows:
H03: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, epistemic beliefs of undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemic Belief
Inventory, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as measured by the Attitudes
about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions about GMFs. Results did
not indicate a significant predictive relationship between the predictor variable (EBI Score) and
the criterion variable (Attitudes towards GMFs Score). Thus, the null hypothesis was not rejected
at a 98% confidence interval: F(1, 76) = .373, p = .543. See Figure 3 for the scatter plot, Table 6
for the results of the ANOVA, and Table 7 for the results of the model analysis.

Figure 3
Scatter Plot of Criterion and Predictor Variables for H03
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Table 6
ANOVA Results for H03
Source
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
3.655
744.307
747.962

df
1
76
77

Mean Square
3.655
9.794

F
.373

Sig.
.543

Table 7
Model Summary for H03
R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

.070

.005

-.008

3.129

The fourth null hypothesis is as follows:
H04: The fourth null hypothesis is as follows: There is no statistically significant
predictive relationship between the predictor variable, positive epistemic emotions of
undergraduate students, as measured by the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, and the
criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as measured by the Attitudes about GMFs survey
following refutation of common misconceptions about GMFs. Results did not indicate a
significant predictive relationship between the predictor variable (EES Positive Score) and the
criterion variable (Attitudes towards GMFs Score). Thus, the null hypothesis was not rejected at
a 98% confidence interval: F(1, 76) = 3.818, p = .054. See Figure 4 for the scatter plot, Table 8
for the results of the ANOVA, and Table 9 for the results of the model analysis.
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Figure 4
Scatter Plot of Criterion and Predictor Variables for H04

Table 8
ANOVA Results for H04
Source
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
35.777
712.184
747.962

df
1
76
77

Mean Square
35.777
9.371

F
3.818

Table 9
Model Summary for H04
R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

.219

.048

.035

3.061

Sig.
.054
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The fifth null hypothesis is as follows:
H05: There is no statistically significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable, negative epistemic emotions of undergraduate students, as measured by the
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, and the criterion variable, attitudes towards GMFs, as
measured by the Attitudes about GMFs survey following refutation of common misconceptions
about GMFs. Results indicated a significant predictive relationship between the predictor
variable (EES Negative Score) and the criterion variable (Attitudes towards GMFs Score). Thus,
the null hypothesis was rejected at a 98% confidence interval: F(1, 76) = 7.875, p = .006. The
regression analysis yielded an R-value of .306, indicated a medium effect size. See Figure 5 for
the scatter plot, Table 10 for the results of the ANOVA, and Table 11 for the results of the model
analysis.
Figure 5
Scatter Plot of Criterion and Predictor Variables for H05
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Table 10
ANOVA Results for H05
Source
Regression
Residual
Total

Sum of Squares
70.228
677.734
747.962

df
1
76
77

Mean Square
70.228
8.918

F
7.875

Table 11
Model Summary for H05
R

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

.306

.094

.082

2.986

Sig.
.006
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS
Overview
This chapter will discuss the findings of this study, including their implications,
limitations, and recommendations for future research. It will begin with an analysis of the results
for each research question in light of the relevant literature. Next, the research and practical
implications of the study will be discussed. Lastly, the studies limitations will be addressed,
along with considerations for future research.
Discussion
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between epistemic beliefs,
epistemic emotions, and attitudes towards GMFs among undergraduate students. This was
accomplished by addressing three research questions. The first question addressed the effects of
epistemic belief on epistemic emotions, both positive and negative. The second explored the
effects of epistemic beliefs on attitudes towards GMFs. The third examined the relationship
between epistemic emotions, both positive and negative, on attitudes towards GMFs. These three
questions generated five hypotheses. Each hypothesis was tested through the use of bivariate
linear regression to determine if a predictive relationship existed.
Research Question 1
Epistemic beliefs, as measured using the Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI), were
compared to epistemic emotions, as measured using the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales
(EES). Two null hypotheses were used in order to evaluate positive emotions (surprise, curiosity,
and enjoyment) as well as negative emotions (confusion, anxiety, frustration, and boredom). The
results of the bivariate regression analyses indicated no predictive relationship between EBI
score and positive or negative EES scores, failing to reject the null hypotheses.
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The theoretical basis for the interplay between epistemic beliefs and emotions is well
established (Bendixen & Rule, 2004; Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018; Pekrun, 2006). Posner et al.
(1982) noted that learning information that is inconsistent with one’s beliefs results in negative
emotions. The effect of such beliefs on epistemic emotions has also been experimentally
demonstrated (Rosman & Mayer, 2018). Multiple studies have shown that efforts to address
epistemic beliefs have positively impacted epistemic emotions of students learning about climate
change, and have even improved critical thinking surrounding the topic (Chevrier et al., 2019;
Muis et al., 2015; Trevors et al., 2017). Similarly, more constructivist epistemic beliefs have also
been correlated to more positive emotions while learning about GMFs. In particular, participants’
beliefs about the complexity, source, justification, and certainty of knowledge had variable
effects on their emotions when presented with a text refuting common misconception about
GMFs. Participants with more constructivist beliefs were more likely to have positive emotional
responses to the correction of GMF misconceptions (Muis et al., 2021). However, this
relationship was not demonstrated in the current study. The results instead failed to indicate a
significant correlation between epistemic beliefs and epistemic emotions, be they positive or
negative.
Research Question 2
Epistemic beliefs were also compared to participants’ attitudes towards GMFs. The
results of the bivariate linear regression indicated no significant predictive relationship between
epistemic beliefs and GMF attitudes, failing to reject the third null hypothesis.
Theoretical models of conceptual change have increasingly incorporated the factors of
epistemic belief on attitude change (Nadelson et al., 2018; Sinatra & Seyranian, 2016). More
mature epistemic beliefs have been experimentally correlated to SSI attitudes, namely acceptance

79
of evolution (Borgerding et al., 2017). Trevors et al. (2016) also demonstrated the effect of
individual self-concept, including epistemic beliefs, on attitudes towards GMFs. GMF
misconceptions have also been correlated with increased construal-based reasoning, particularly
essentialism (Potter et al., 2017). For example, Pope et al. (2017) found that Christians relied
more heavily on essentialist and teleological arguments. Furthermore, epistemic beliefs have
been shown to influence epistemic emotions (Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018; Muis et al., 2021),
which are mediators between conceptual change and attitude change (Heddy et al., 2017;
McPhetres et al., 2019). However, the results of the current study failed to demonstrate the
correlation between epistemic beliefs and attitudes towards GMFs. These results are not
surprising given the aforementioned lack of correlation between epistemic beliefs and emotions,
which typically mediate attitudes towards such topics.
Research Question 3
The final research question concerned the effect of epistemic emotions on attitudes
towards GMFs. Two null hypotheses were used: one for positive emotions and one for negative
emotions. The results indicated no predictive relationship between positive emotions and
attitudes towards GMFs. However, negative emotions were found to have a significant
correlation with more negative attitudes towards GMFs. Therefore, the results failed to reject the
fourth null hypothesis, but rejected the fifth.
Several studies have explored the impact of emotions on attitudes towards GMFs,
primarily in the context of conceptual and attitude change. While the current study did not assess
changes in attitude, several points of comparison still exist. Petty and Briñol (2015) theorized
that emotions act as mediators between conceptual and attitude change. This relationship was
later demonstrated in several studies that assessed college students’ emotions and attitudes
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towards GMFs following the correction of misconceptions (Chrispeels et al., 2019; Heddy et al.,
2017; Muis et al., 2020; Thacker et al., 2020).
Prior research has shown that prior general knowledge does not predict positive attitudes
towards GMFs, knowledge of biology and biotechnology does predict such attitudes (Allum et
al., 2008; McPhetres et al., 2019). Similarly, the current study found moderate attitudes among
non-biology majors, with a mean score of 12.88 on the Attitudes towards GMFs survey.
However, positive emotions were not found to be correlated to positive attitudes. In contrast,
prior studies have found that GMF attitude change correlated more strongly with positive
emotions than negative emotions (Heddy et al., 2017; Thacker et al., 2020). Though again, the
current study is only measuring change after exposure to a refutation text without a prior
measurement for comparison.
The findings of the current study indicated a statistically significant, negative relationship
between EES negative scores and scores on the Attitudes towards GMFs survey. The regression
analysis indicated a medium effect size. Because lower scores for the latter survey indicate more
negative attitudes, these findings demonstrate a direct correlation between negative emotions and
negative attitudes. These findings are consistent with the general pattern of emotional and
attitude change in other studies (Heddy et al., 2017; Muis et al., 2020). However, this correlation
was found after participants read a text refuting common GMF misconceptions a persuasive text
arguing for their use. The current study cannot evaluate whether their attitudes changed as a
result of this experience, but the prevalence of negative emotions following these texts warrants
further consideration. The strongest negative attitudes towards GMFs have been correlated with
weak GMF knowledge and strong confidence, which is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger
effect (Fernbach et al., 2019). According to this effect, people often overestimate their own
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understanding of unfamiliar topics, resulting in disproportionate confidence and erroneous
conclusions (Kruger & Dunning, 1999). To this end, some studies have successfully
demonstrated increases in positive attitudes through extended educational efforts (Chrispeels et
al., 2019; McPhetres et al., 2019). However, another possibility is that participants’ attitudes
became more polarized in response to the refutation and persuasive texts. The backfire effect,
which occurs when attempts to correct misconceptions instead result in increased commitment,
have been documented in multiple SSIs, including GMFs (Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Dinsmore
et al. (2017) found that some participants actually adopted less complex viewpoints when
presented with a persuasive texts attempting to correct GMF misconceptions. Similarly, Trevors
et al. (2016) proposed that some people’s self-concepts can become threatened by refutation of
prior conceptions about GMFs, resulting in a defensive response to the information. This
reaction then leads to negative emotions and attitudes and can impair learning. Thus, emotions
may push attitudes further to their valence, be it positive or negative (Muis et al., 2020).
Among the negative emotions that correlated with negative attitudes towards GMFs was
confusion. Confusion is one of the most common epistemic emotions encountered by students,
and is typically unpleasant. Confusion is a natural response to the disequilibrium caused by
discrepancies between prior conceptions and new information (D’Mello & Graesser, 2012). Left
unresolved, confusion results in frustration. However, if confusion is resolved, it can lead to
positive emotions and improved learning (D’Mello et al., 2014; Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018). This
was demonstrated by Muis et al. (2021), who found that confusion and anxiety actually predicted
higher critical thinking regarding GMFs. Thus, in the long run, such negative emotions may lead
to more careful consideration of GMFs.
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Implications
This study sought to address the gap in the research literature of the effects of epistemic
beliefs and emotions on attitudes towards GMFs. The findings did not demonstrate significant
correlations between epistemic beliefs and emotions that had been shown in previous studies
(Chevrier et al., 2019; Muis et al., 2021; Trevors et al., 2016). They also did not demonstrate a
relationship between epistemic beliefs and attitudes towards GMFs. However, the findings
demonstrated a significant predictive correlation between negative epistemic emotions and
attitudes towards GMFs. These results were consistent with previous findings that a relationship
existed, and added further clarity to the nature of this relationship (Heddy et al., 2017; Muis et
al., 2020; Thacker et al., 2020).
Furthermore, the scholarly implications of this study extend to ongoing considerations of
science literacy in society. Adherents of the deficit model propose that attitudes towards SSI are
primarily shaped by access to information (Simis et al., 2016). Thus, opposing attitudes towards
GMFs can be remedied by correcting misconceptions. However, the findings of this study further
emphasize the role of epistemic emotions in the process of conceptual change. Participants read a
refutation text designed to correct GMF misconceptions, as well as a text that persuasively
argued for the benefits of genetic engineering technology in the food system. Then, they reported
negative epistemic emotions that directly correlated with negative attitudes towards GMFs.
These results support the previous findings that epistemic emotions are a significant factor in
predicting attitudes towards GMFs.
Educational research is not merely scholarly in nature but is also intended to inform
practice. Therefore, these findings bear practical classroom implications for science educators.
The use of SSIs allows students to apply scientific concepts to pressing societal issues, including
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GMFs. However, lack of consideration for epistemic factors may result in reduced efficacy.
Efforts should be made to discuss these topics in a winsome and positive fashion. If students are
able to experience less frustration, anxiety, and boredom while learning about GMFs, they are
less likely to develop negative attitudes. If confusion is used as a learning opportunity, it is less
likely to grow into frustration and more likely to yield positive emotions (D’Mello et al., 2014;
Muis, Chevrier et al., 2018). Furthermore, positive emotions also predict more effective learning
strategies (Chevrier et al., 2019; Muis et al., 2015).
Limitations
Despite the relevance of these findings to both research and practice, generalizability is
limited by number of factors. While the sample size (N = 78) was large enough to exceed the
requirements for a medium effect size (N = 66), a larger sample would improve clarity of the
results (Gall et al., 2007). Participants were drawn from a convenience sample of students in
eight classes at one university. Moreover, the majority of participants (96%) were of Christian
affiliation, which may have impacted epistemic beliefs and prevalence of construal-based
reasoning (Pope et al., 2017).
Additionally, the selection criteria for this study required that participants be from nonbiology majors who had not taken a college-level biology course. This was meant to reduce the
possibility that they had formed educated attitudes towards GMFs. However, it may also have
resulted in a lower value placed on the topic, which is a key factor influencing emotional
response (Pekrun, 2006). Decreased value may also result in decreased elaboration, which can
influence attitude change (Petty & Briñol, 2015). Lower value may decreased cognitive
processing, resulting in more emotional consideration of perceived risk (Loewenstein et al.,
2001).
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In this study, epistemic emotions were clustered into positive (surprise, curiosity,
enjoyment) and negative (confusion, anxiety, frustration, boredom). While the findings indicated
a predictive relationship between negative emotion and negative attitudes towards GMFs, the
analysis cannot distinguish which emotions were specifically correlated. Furthermore, at times,
confusion has been shown to have positive epistemic effects, which cannot be distinguished in
the present study (D’Mello et al., 2014).
Finally, these findings cannot measure change in conceptions, epistemic emotions, or
attitudes towards GMFs through the course of the study. The variables were each measured once,
which indicated a correlation between negative emotions and negative attitudes. However, this
leaves many unanswered questions concerning the interplay of epistemic beliefs and emotions
during conceptual and emotional change.
Recommendations for Future Research
Future research into this topic should seek to address the above limitations in
generalizability. A larger sample drawn from multiple universities would provide greater clarity
into the variables being measured. Further, a more diverse sampling of religious worldviews may
further illuminate the relationships between epistemic beliefs, emotions, and attitudes towards
GMFs.
Later studies should also incorporate biology majors, whose assessment of value may be
higher than non-majors. Previous research has shown that higher value is correlated to greater
surprise in response to GMF refutation texts (Muis, Sinatra et al., 2018). This may help clarify
the relationship between positive emotions and attitudes towards GMFs.
In contrast to the present study, future research should seek to explore the role of separate
emotions. This could further clarify one outcome of the present study. A slight association was

85
observed between epistemic beliefs and negative epistemic emotions. The second null hypothesis
was rejected because this correlation did not meet the threshold for statistical significance.
However, further study into separate emotions may find a significant predictive relationship.
Additionally, further research could explore the relationship between epistemic beliefs
and emotions in the context of conceptual and attitude change. The present study was limited to a
single assessment of each variable, with no assessment of participants’ misconceptions about
GMFs. Addressing the role of beliefs and emotions during conceptual and attitude change would
allow for more direct comparison with other findings (Heddy et al., 2017; McPhetres et al.,
2019). Additional research to consider includes:
1. Exploring the influence of Christian worldview on epistemic beliefs and attitudes
towards GMFs.
2. Comparing epistemic beliefs and emotions between biology majors and non-majors.
3. Exploring the role of confusion on GMF attitudes in low-elaboration and highelaboration settings.
4. The impact of activating and deactivating epistemic emotions on conceptual and
attitude change regarding GMFs.
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APPENDIX B: Refutation & Persuasive Texts
The following refutation text addresses common misconceptions about GMFs (Thacker et
al., 2020):
This text was removed due to copyright.
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APPENDIX C: Permission to Use Instruments
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Lisa

105
Permission to use Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales (EES)
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APPENDIX D: Survey Results
Table 12
Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) Subscale Response Percentages
Question
1. Most things worth knowing are easy to understand.

Strongly Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly
Disagree
Agree
6.4
42.3
12.8
29.5
9.0

2. What is true is a matter of opinion.

43.6

28.2

14.1

12.8

1.3

3. Students who learn things quickly are the most successful.

9.0

59.0

14.1

14.1

3.8

4. People should always obey the law.

1.3

17.9

24.4

42.3

14.1

5. People's intellectual potential is fixed at birth.

25.6

50.0

16.7

7.7

0.0

6. Absolute moral truth does not exist.*

43.6

26.9

20.5

7.7

1.3

7. Parents should teach their children all there is to know about life.

1.3

33.3

21.8

35.9

7.7

8. Really smart students don't have to work as hard to do well in school.

10.3

42.3

10.3

32.1

5.1

end up being confused.

6.4

43.6

16.7

28.2

5.1

10. Too many theories just complicate things.

7.7

28.2

24.4

35.9

3.8

11. The best ideas are often the most simple.

2.6

30.8

19.2

37.2

10.3

12. Instructors should focus on facts instead of theories.

2.6

35.9

32.1

26.9

2.6

13. Some people are born with special gifts and talents.

0.0

7.7

3.8

38.5

50.0

14. How well you do in school depends on how smart you are.

24.4

52.6

11.5

11.5

0.0

15. If you don't learn something quickly, you won't ever learn it.

59.7

36.4

2.6

1.3

0.0

9. If a person tries too hard to understand a problem, they will most likely
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Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI) Subscale Response Percentages (continued)
Question
16. Some people just have a knack for learning and others don't.

Strongly Disagree Unsure Agree Strongly
Disagree
Agree
5.1
17.9
7.7
56.4
12.8

17. Things are simpler than most professors would have you believe.

2.6

25.6

29.5

38.5

3.8

wrong.

14.1

59.0

10.3

14.1

2.6

19. Children should be allowed to question their parents' authority.*

12.8

33.3

25.6

24.4

3.8

over it won't help.

42.3

51.3

3.8

2.6

0.0

21. Science is easy to understand because it contains so many facts.

24.4

44.9

17.9

11.5

1.3

22. The more you know about a topic, the more there is to know.

0.0

3.8

23.1

56.4

16.7

23. What is true today will be true tomorrow.

7.7

37.2

21.8

19.2

14.1

24. Smart people are born that way.

11.5

51.3

20.5

16.7

0.0

25. When someone in authority tells me what to do, I usually do it.

1.3

5.1

15.4

60.3

17.9

26. People shouldn't question authority.

12.8

53.8

20.5

7.7

5.1

27. Working on a problem with no quick solution is a waste of time.

37.7

51.9

5.2

3.9

1.3

28. Sometimes there are no right answers to life's big problems.

3.8

19.2

14.1

43.6

19.2

18. If two people are arguing about something, at least one of them must be

20. If you haven't understood a chapter the first time through, going back

* These questions were reverse-coded.
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Table 13
Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales (EES) Subscale Response Percentages
Positive

Negative

Emotion

Not at all

Very Little

Moderate

Strong

Very Strong

Surprised

6.4

21.8

62.8

9.0

0.0

Curious

1.3

17.9

46.2

29.5

5.1

Excited

11.5

34.6

41.0

12.8

0.0

Confused

20.5

23.1

43.6

11.5

1.3

Anxious

29.5

33.3

21.8

10.3

5.1

Frustrated

38.5

26.9

24.4

7.7

2.6

Bored

9.0

26.9

34.6

25.6

3.8

Table 14
Attitudes towards GMFs Subscale Response Percentages
Question

Not at all

Very Little Moderate Strong Very Strong

1. Genetically modified foods are okay with me.

3.8

23.1

34.6

30.8

7.7

2. Genetically modified foods are beneficial to society.

2.6

16.7

30.8

46.2

3.8

3. I approve of genetically modified foods.

3.8

17.9

46.2

29.5

2.6

4. I would eat food that has been genetically modified.

3.8

17.9

28.2

42.3

7.7

